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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Classical materialism maintained that a man was noth-
ing over and above a vast arrangement of particles in motion. 
Modern materialism differs from classical materialism in re-
fusing to specify the kind of entities which ultimately make 
up the furniture of the world, including man. These enti-
ties may turn out not to be particles or anything like parti-
cles. It is the science of the future to which we must look 
for the answer to this question. But modern materialism 
agrees with classical materialism in the prediction that 
everything in the world, including the behavior of man, 
will be completely explicable in terms of entities which 
fall wholly within the province of physics. Because of this 
emphasis on the idea that we must await the outcome of scien-
tific inquiry, perhaps in some far distant future, to know 
what man is, modern materialism is sometimes called scien-
tific materialism. Professor J.J.C. Smart, a leading expon-
ent of scientific materialism, confesses his faith, in the 
following well-known passage, in the power of science 
finally to come up with the definitive answer to this 
question which has perplexed philosophers from at least 
1 
the time of Socrates: 
It seems to me that science is increasingly giving 
us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen 
as physicochemical mechanisms: it seems that even 
2 
the behavior of man himself will one day be explicable 
in mechanistic terms. There does seem to be, so far as 
science is concerned, nothing in the world but increas-
ingly complex arrangements of physical constituents. 
All except for one place: in consciousness •••• 
[S]ensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be 
the one sort of thing left outside the physicalist pic-
ture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe 
that this can be so. That everything should be explica-
ble in terms of physics • • • except the occurrence of 
sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.l 
It should be clear from this passage that Smart would con-
sider the scientific materialist to have made out his case 
once he has shown that the occurrence of sensations is ex-
plicable in terms of physics. This might seem at first 
. glance a strange position to take, if not a disingenuous 
one, in view of the serious objections which have been 
raised to any form of materialism by Thomistically oriented 
philosophers and contemporary phenomenologists with respect 
to thoughts and their intentionality. It is nevertheless 
an understandable position for those philosophers who, fol-
lowing Descartes, reject anything as a criterion of the 
mental, such as intentionality, which might serve to exclude 
111 sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review, 
VO l. 6 8 ( 19 5 9 ) 1 p • 14 2 • 
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sensations from the realm of the mental. Most defenders 
of scientific materialism, in fact, follow Descartes on 
this point. In any case, the issue which is currently at 
the center of controversy between scientific materialists 
and their opponents concerns the status of sensations rather 
than thoughts. 
The attempt to show that the occurrence of sensations 
is explicable in physicalistic terms has consisted in recent 
years in the defense of what is now simply called the Iden-
tity Theory. The central claim of this theory is that it 
makes sense to assert that empirical inquiry will discover 
that sensations are identical with certain brain processes. 
The theory does not claim that empirical inquiry will discover 
that sensations are identical with certain brain processes 
but only that it makes sense to assert that it will. This 
is in line with the previously mentioned hesitation to specu-
late now upon the outcome of future empirical inquiry con-
cerning the nature of man. But, in view of such diffidence, 
why should it be thought important to establish the 
meaningfulness of asserting that empirical inquiry will 
discover that sensations are identical with· certain brain 
processes? The answer is that materialists cannot be 
4 
satisfied with a mere correlation between sensations and 
physical states or processes. There is a sense in which 
some forms of relation which have been thought to hold be-
tween sensations and physical states or processes make the 
occurrence of the former explicable in physicalistic terms. 
Such is the case with epiphenomenalism, which maintains that 
the occurrence of sensations can be wholly accounted for by 
• 
occurrences within the body. Such forms of relation do not 
help the materialist, however, since he wants to hold that 
the occurrence of sensations is explicable in physicalistic 
terms in the sense that the former is nothing over and above 
the latter. His position is, therefore, that sensations 
are identical with certain physical states or processes in 
some sense of "identical." Moreover, for analogous reasons, 
materialists cannot be satisfied with a mere correlation 
between properties of sensations and properties of those 
physical states or processes with which sensations have been 
identified, as would be maintained by the double-aspect 
theory. Does this mean that the corresponding properties 
must also be held identical in some sense of "identical?" 
There seems to be no general agreement among materialists 
5 
on this point. Indeed, the problem of what to do with prop-
erties has proved a most difficult one and has occasioned 
some of the subtlest reasoning on this topic. 
Now there is a straightforward sense of "identical" in 
which sensations have been claimed to be identical with cer-
tain physical states or processes. This is the sense which 
expresses the relation of "strict identity," that is, the re-
lation such that 
(x) (y) ( (x = y) ::l (F) (Fx = Fy)) • 
Thus, if a given sensation is strictly identical with (say) 
a certain brain process, then all (nonintentional and non-
modal) properties truly predicable of the sensation are 
truly predicable of the brain process, and conversely. On 
the face of it, however, strict identity cannot hold between 
sensations and brain processes, or, for that matter, between 
sensations and any other physical states or processes. And 
this "cannot" is logical. It is not simply that some proper-
ties truly predicable of a sensation are not in fact truly 
predicable of any physical state or process, or conversely. 
Rather, some properties truly predicable of the one are appar-
ently not predicable at all of the other. For the predicates 
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which express these properties seem to be of a different log~ 
ical type than the expressions which refer to the other. 
They seem to belong to different "logical categories" or to 
different "logical spaces" or to different "language-games." 
Thus, while we certainly can say that a pain, for example, is 
throbbing or becomes more or less intense, it would seem to be 
not merely false but, in a certain sense, senseless to apply 
these predicates to physical processes such as brain proc-
esses. Again, while a brain process can be correctly said 
to be occurring three feet from the kitchen table, to apply 
this predicate to the experience of having a pain would seem 
to result in a certain kind of nonsense. Further, the rela-
tion of identity between sensations and brain processes would 
have to be contingent, since (to mention only one reason) a 
person who reports sensations need know nothing about brain 
processes. But contingent identity can hold only between 
terms which are independently identifiable, and this seems 
to imply that sensations must have some properties that are 
not reducible to physicalistic properties. In view of con-
siderations such as these, philosophers, especially so-
called "linguistic" philosophers, have charged materialists 
with coIP.mitting "categOI"'.f mistakes" or with being guilty of 
7 
"conceptual confusion. 11 Materialists, accordingly, have 
thought it important in recent years to defend the view that 
it is sensible to assert that empirical inquiry will dis-
cover that sensations are identical with certain brain proc-
esses, however diffident they may be about what empirical 
inquiry will in fact discover. 
It may be thought that the shortest way with objections 
of this kind is to argue that sensations are identical with 
certain brain processes in a sense other than that of strict 
identity. But this is not the case. For it is difficult to 
see what other sense of "identical" there can be which does 
not reduce simply to mere "correlation." For this reason, 
some philosophers who defend the Identity Theory claim that 
it is the sense of strict identity in which sensations are 
identical to certain brain processes, but then go on to argue 
that this claim does not involve one in category mistakes 
or conceptual confusion. Smart is one of the most notable 
of such philosophers in recent years. Smart argues that 
sensation reports are neutral between psychic and physicalis-
tic logical categories because such reports are simply 
classifications of sensations in terms of bare 
8 
. · 1 •t• 1 s1m1 ar1 ies. Thus, "I have a pain," according to Smart, is 
roughly equivalent to "What is going on in me is like what 
goes on in me when a pin is stuck into me." The analysans in 
this case simply reports similarities without saying wherein 
these similarities consist. One focus of controversy over 
this translation version of the Identity Theory concerns the 
adequacy of such proposed translations. It has been objected, 
for example, that these rough equivalences cannot be trans-
formed into strict equivalences without a corresponding 
loss of their neutrality. 2 Richard Rorty, another well-
known defender of the Identity Theory, regards objections 
of this kind as ineluctable for any version of the Identity 
Theory which claims strict identity between sensations and 
brain processes and so has chosen the more difficult task 
of trying to make clear a sense of identity which is neith-
er strict identity nor a relation that reduces to mere 
correlation and which could sensibly be asserted to hold 
1see ibid., pp. 149-50. The version of the Identity 
Theory which Smart defends was originally put forward by U. 
T. Place ("Is Consciousness a Brain Process?," British 
Journal of Psychology, vol. 47 (1956), pp. 44-50), but it is 
Smart's article that has received most attention. · 
2see Kurt Baier, "Smart on Sensations,~· Australasian 
Journal of Philoso~hy, vol. 40 (1962), p. 66, n. 23, and 
James W. Cornman,The Identity of Mind and Body," Journal 
of Philosophy, vol. 59 (1962), pp. 489-90. 
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between sensations and certain brain processes. In the 
course of the article in which Rorty introduces his own 
1 theory, Smart's theory is summarily discussed and dismissed 
by appeal to the difficulty of providing adequate transla-
tions. But even in this early article, it is clear that 
Rorty's disagreement with Smart runs much deeper. The basic 
issue dividing them is not so much the possibility of provid-
ing adequate translations as it is the possibility of report-
ing bare similarities. The latter seems to imply that there 
is an activity which can reasonably be called "awareness" 
prior to the learning of language. Rorty, however, wishes 
to ally himself with Wittgenstein and many of his followers 
in the battle against such a notion of awareness--a battle, 
indeed, which he takes as having already been won. More 
specifically, what Wittgenstein and his followers have 
argued and Rorty accepts is that the possibility of picking 
out something as an object of awareness requires that it be 
identifiable as an item of some definite sort and that the 
classification of items just consists in the classification 
111 Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," Review 
of Metaphysics, vol. 19 (1965), pp. 24-54. 
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of expressions for them according to the conceptual scheme 
embedded in a language. Expressions for sensations, accord-
ingly, must be tied up logically, that is, in conformity 
with the rules of the conceptual scheme, with other sorts 
of eA-pressions if the former are to be referring expressions 
at all. 
Now this view would seem to be inconsistent with the 
claim that it makes sense to assert the identity of sensa-
tions and brain processes. For if there is no possibility 
of reporting bare similarities, the need for providing inde-
pendent identifications of both terms between which the con-
tingent identity relation is supposed to hold can apparently 
be satisfied only by the recognition of irreducibly psychic 
properties. And then it is not easy to see how the Identity 
Theorist can escape the charge that he is committing "cate-
gory mistakes" or is guilty of "conceptual confusion." Rorty 
proposes a way out for the Identity Theorist who sympathizes 
with Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of pre-linguistic 
awareness. We can simply change the conceptual scheme which 
is embedded in the language we speak. 
[T]he classifications of linguistic expressions that 
are the ground of [the Identity Theorist's] opponents' 
criticism are classifications of a language which is 
11 
as it is because it is the language spoken at a given 
stage of empirical inquiry. But the sort of empirical 
results that would show brain processes and sensations 
to be identical would also bring about changes in our 
ways of speaking. These changes would make these 
classifications out of date • • • • There is simply 
no such thing as a method of classifying linguistic 
expressions that has results guaranteed to remain in-1 tact despite the results of future empirical inquiry. 
once these changes are made, we can go on (sensibly) to as-
sert that sensations are identical with certain brain proc-
esses, meaning by "identical" here "the sort of relation 
which obtains between, to put it crudely, existent entities 
and non-existent entities when reference to the latter once 
served (some of) the purposes presently served by reference 
to the former--the sort of relation that holds, e.g., be-
tween 'quantity of caloric fluid' and 'mean kinetic energy 
2 
of molecules.'" To put it less crudely, Rorty is propos-
ing that the statement 
Sensations are identical with certain brain processes 
should be analyzed as 
What people now call "sensations" are identical with 
certain brain processes 
where the word "identical" in the analysans, but not in 
1Rorty, ibid., pp. 24-25. 
2 Rorty, ibid., p. 26. 
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the analysandum, signifies the relation of strict identity. 
The reason why the word "identical" in the analysandum can-
not signify the relation of strict identity is that the ex-
pression being used for what is asserted to be identical 
with certain brain processes does not belong to the same 
logical category to which some predicates true of brain proc-
esses belong. The analysans neatly avoids this difficulty 
by embedding the of fending expression in a context in which 
it occurs non-referentially. Although the word "sensations" 
does occur in the expression used to refer to what is as-
serted to be identical with certain brain processes, "sensa-
tions" is not itself being used to refer; it is not being 
used at all but only mentioned. And so far as the expres-
sion which is being used to refer is concerned, viz., "What 
people now call 'sensations,'" there seems to be no reason 
why it should not be in the same logical category as any 
predicate true of brain processes. 
As subtle and ingenious as this strategy is, it is a 
strategy, I think, for losing the war in which Wittgenstein 
and some of his followers were engaged when, according to 
Rorty, they won the battle against the notion of pre-
lingui$tic awareness. Rorty admits, and indeed it is 
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difficult to deny, that the discourse in favor of which 
sensation-discourse is to be eliminated would serve only 
some of the purposes presently served by the latter. That 
brain-discourse would not serve, at least initially, the ex-
pressive purposes served by sensation-discourse goes without 
question. Such purposes, however, are not what is at issue 
here. In any case, they could be provided for in other ways 
if necessary. More to the point, sensation-discourse tends 
to give rise to certain kinds of questions about ourselves 
and the world and leaves room for certain kinds of answers 
to these questions while excluding others. And it does so 
in virtue of the type of discourse which it is--in virtue, 
that is, of the set of conceptual relations peculiar to it. 
As Wittgenstein says: 
Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expres-
sion of our interests, and direct our interests.I 
Neurophysiological discourse gives rise to other kinds of 
questions and excludes certain kinds of answers which 
sensation-discourse permits. Would not, then, the elimina-
tion of sensation-discourse impoverish our understanding 
1Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe 
{New York: Macmillw"l, 1953), sec. 570. 
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of ourselves and the world? Rorty does not think so. Talk 
about "quantity of caloric fluid" is also associated with 
certain kinds of questions and permissible answers which 
are out of place in talk about "mean kinetic energy of mole-
cules." But the rejection of these kinds of questions and 
answers has not diminished but, on the contrary, enhanced 
our understanding of the world. Again, talk about demons 
is associated with certain kinds of questions and permissible 
answers which are out of place in talk about germs and hal-
lucinations. Yet, we are none the poorer for having allowed 
demon-discourse to fall into desuetude. Why should sensa-
tion-discourse be thought to occupy a privileged position, 
immune to the kinds of criticism which led to the elimina-
tion of demon-discourse and talk about "quantity of caloric 
fluid?" One question sometimes deserves another. What is 
our justification for replacing talk about "quantity of 
caloric fluid" with talk about "mean kinetic energy of 
molecules," demon-discourse with talk about germs and 
hallucinations? Rorty's answer is simplicity and the fact 
that all the predictive and explanatory advantages of mod-
ern science are retained. Now the standards of justifica-
tion appropriate to modern science may indeed be relevant 
15 
to the evaluation of these two kinds of discourse, but why 
should these standards be thought to have the sort of magis-
terial neutrality which gives one the right to employ them 
in evaluating any discourse whatever? If the notion that 
there is no such thing as pre-linguistic awareness means any-
thing at all, it means at least that there is no such neutral 
point from which one can evaluate the different sets of con-
ceptual relations, or logical spaces, which make up the con-
ceptual scheme embedded in the way we talk. Wittgenstein 
remarks: 
How is the word 'justification' used? Describe lan-
guage-games. From these you will also be able to see 
the importance of being justified.l 
Again, he says: 
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we 
ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon.' 
That is, where we ought to have said: this language-
game is played.2 
The problem of justification, I think, is the most serious 
one which Rorty's version of the Identity Theory has to 
face. It is a problem about which I will have a great deal 
1Ibid., sec. 486. 
2Ibid., sec. 654. 
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more to say in later chapters. Rorty is not unaware of this 
problem and offers by way of solution a general theory of 
the conditions under which a term may cease to have a re-
£erring use. This theory, however, as I will argue in Chap-
ter II, has no legitimate application in the case of sensa-
tion-terms. The reason why it lacks such an application is 
connected with a second problem. Identity Theorists are 
right, I believe, to reject the view that it cannot make 
sense to assert that empirical inquiry will discover that 
sensations are identical with certain brain processes unless 
it also makes sense to assert that empirical inquiry will 
discover that other mental states, such as thoughts, be-
liefs, desires, intentions, and attitudes, are identical 
with certain brain processes. For many reasons, it is 
implausible to maintain that mental states such as these 
are identical with brain processes. This does not mean, 
of course, that materialism must inevitably come to ship-
wreck over such mental states, for there are good reasons for 
thinking that they will eventually submit to behavioristic 
explanations (although there are also good reasons for 
thinking that they will not). Mental states comprise a 
highly_diverse lot and should all be expected to fall 
17 
under one type of explanation. But it does not follow from 
their diverse character that they are not in any sense logi-
cally connected with one another. I accept P. F. Strawson's 
view that "the topic of the mind does not divide into uncon-
nected subjects. 111 Each type of mental state is inextrica-
bly bound up with the others, interwoven with them. I also 
hold, as do Strawson and even Rorty, that the connection be-
tween them is in some sense logical. Given this view of the 
mind, which is shared both by defenders of Eliminative Mate-
rialism and their "linguistic" opponents, it ought to be 
asked what effect the elimination of sensation-discourse 
would have on other types of mental discourse. If the elim-
ination of sensation-discourse would make significant parts 
of other commonly employed types of mental discourse unin-
telligible, then this at least would be an important dis-
analogy between such elimination and the elimination of 
demon-discourse or discourse employing the concept of 
caloric fluid. And it is primarily analogies with the 
elimination of other types of discourse to which Elimi-
Materialists appeal to make out their case. This is a 
1Individuals (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 
1963), p. 109. 
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question, however, which has barely been discussed. The 
reason, I believe, is twofold: first, a concentration 
on too narrow a range of cases and, second, an uncritical 
acceptance of an oversimplified view regarding the nature of 
the logical connections between mental states. By concen-
trating only on cases in which sensation-discourse either 
replaces the primitive, natural expressions of sensation, 
such as crying or grimacing, or explains them, the connec-
tion of sensation-discourse with other types of discourse--
in particular, discourse in terms of desires, intentions, 
and attitudes--has been overlooked. As Wittgenstein points 
out: 
We surely do not always say someone is complaining, 
because he is in pain. So the words 'I am in pain' 1 
may be a cry of complaint, and may be something else. 
Sensation-discourse is employed in the explanation of a 
whole range of human actions, respecting many of which ex-
planation in wholly physiological terms or even physiologi-
cal-cum-behavioristic terms would be singularly inappropri-
ate. This is a point I try to bring out in Chapter II. If, 
however, the logical connections between mental states were 
1 2£· cit., p. 189. 
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of the nature of linguistic conventions easily modifiable 
in light of future scientific advances, as Rorty holds, the 
elimination of sensation-discourse need not make unintelli-
gible significant parts of these other types of discourse. 
Now I would agree that the logical connections between mental 
states are based on contingent facts. But it does not fol-
low from this that these connections are contingent on the 
state of empirical inquiry. In Chapter III, I argue that 
the contingent facts underlying the connection between pain 
and wanting are such that the elimination of that part of 
sensation-discourse employing the concept of pain would make 
unintelligible a significant part of discourse employing the 
concept of wanting. With respect to the suggestion that it 
might be possible also to eliminate the latter type of dis-
course, I try to show that its elimination would make unin-
telligible a significant part of discourse employing the 
concept of intention and, further, that there is a logical 
absurdity in the idea that the existence of intention-
discourse is contingent on the state of empirical inquiry. 
That such consequences would follow from the elimination 
of sensation-discourse would not be enough to show that the 
latter could not be eliminated, however, if it were the 
20 
case either that that part of wanting-discourse or that part 
of intention-discourse which would thereby become unintelli-
gible could also be eliminated without affecting the rest 
of these types of discourse. But the parts of wanting-
discourse and intention-discourse which would be affected 
are exceedingly conunon and exceedingly important. For it is 
in their terms and only in their terms that a great variety 
of human actions--actions of the kind I discuss in Chapter 
II--become intelligible. In view of the extensive range of 
human phenomena which these parts of wanting-discourse and 
intention-discourse explain, therefore, it is doubtful wheth-
er they could be eliminated without thereby radically affect-
ing the rest of these types of discourse and hence even our 
present concept of a person. That such radical changes would 
follow upon the elimination of sensation-discourse constitutes, 
I believe, an important disanalogy between such elimination 
and the elimination of demon-discourse or discourse employ-
ing the concept of caloric fluid and casts serious doubt 
on the claim that the logical connections between mental 
states--at the very least, the logical connections between 
sensations, desires, and intentions implied in those parts 
of wan~ing-discourse and intention-discourse which the 
elimination of sensation-discourse would make unintelligi-
ble--are contingent on the state of empirical inquiry. 
21 
Now if the logical connections between these mental 
states are not contingent on the state of empirical inquiry, 
this has important consequences for a third problem facing 
Eliminative Materialism and, in general, the Identity Theo-
ry. This is the problem of incorrigibility, which has re-
ceived considerable attention in recent literature. It is 
maintained by opponents of the Identity Theory that first-
person present-tense sensation statements are incorrigible 
in a sense in which physiological statements cannot be incor-
rigible and that this shows that physiological statements 
could not in principle replace sensation statements but 
could at most provide only evidence for their truth. Iden-
tity Theorists have sought to meet this objection either by 
challenging the significance of incorrigibility in the 
sense in which it cannot be a feature of physiological state-
ments or by trying to show that it would be reasonable in 
the light of future scientific advances to eliminate this 
feature. In Chapter IV, I consider the major arguments 
which have been offered against the significance of 
incorrigibility for the Identity Theory and argue that they 
22 
fall short of their goal. Arguments on which Identity Theor-
ists tend most to rely in support of the claim that it would 
be reasonable in the light of future scientific advances to 
eliminate incorrigibility are versions of what has come to be 
called the electroencephalogram (EEG} argument. I take up 
this claim in Chapter V. I argue there (1) that the EEG 
argument does not show this claim to be true and {2) that 
no merely empirical argument can show this claim to be 
true. In my argument for {2) I contend that the logical 
connections between sensations, desires, and intentions im-
plied in those parts of wanting-discourse and intention-
discourse which explain actions of the kind I discuss in 
Chapter II are dependent on the feature of incorrigibility 
and, hence, that this feature is not contingent on the state 
of empirical inquiry since these connections are not. 
CHAPTER II 
LAWS AND SENSATIONS 
Eliminative materialism claims that there are no such 
things as sensations. This claim is intuitively implausi-
ble, because it seems to imply that people who report sensa-
tions hold false beliefs. Proponents of eliminative mate-
rialism either accept this consequence and try to explain 
away its implausibility by assimilating the ordinary language 
of sensations to an all-pervasive scientific theory or else 
argue that the claim that there are no such things as sensa-
tions does not have this consequence and try to account for 
its intuitive implausibility in some other way, e.g., the 
practical inconvenience of eliminating sensation talk. 
Feyerabend, for example, adopts the first approach and 
argues that the reason it sounds so implausible to say that 
people who report sensations hold false beliefs is that the 
beliefs to which talk about sensations commits one are part 
of a theory so pervasive that many facts with which one 
might seek to compare the theory in order to test it are 
formulated in terms of the theory and therefore already 
23 
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prejudiced in its favor. 1 This approach, I think, does 
not remove the implausibility but merely serves to shift it 
from the alleged consequences of the claim that there are 
no such things as sensations to what seem to be conse-
quences of the claim that sensations are theoretical con-
structs. One consequence which seems to follow from the 
latter claim, for example, is that we do not directly experi-
ence sensations. For something is a theoretical construct 
only if we do not directly experience it. But sensation-
terms are clear cases of terms used to report what we direct-
1 . 2 y experience. Another consequence of making sensations 
into theoretical constructs is that statements expressed 
by sentences such as 
(1) I have a toothache 
would seem to commit those who assert them to the statement 
expressed by 
(2) There are pains 
in the same way that statements expressed by sentences such 
as 
1see "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," Review 
of Metaphysics, vol. 17 (1963), pp. 50-53. 
2For the development of this objection, see James W. 
Cornman, 11 Mental Terms Theoretical Terms, and Materialism," 
Philosophy of Science, XXXV (1968), 45-63. 
(3) Those tracks (on the glass surface of a Wilson 
Cloud Chamber) were made by electrons 
commit those who assert them to the statement expressed by 
(4) There are electrons. 
But the move from (1) to (2) is just not on a par with the 
move from (3) to (4). A statement requires circumstances. 
(1) expresses the statement that I have a toothache only 
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in certain circumstances. Suppose a stranger came up to me, 
uttered (1), and then quickly walked away. Did he make a 
statement? What statement? Was he a foreigner who did not 
know the language and thought that (1) expressed a warning 
to watch out for the open manhole I was approaching? Did 
he mistake me for an accomplice to whom he wanted to relay 
an important message in code? Was he a motorist whose new 
car had just broken down again and who in exasperation 
wanted to tell the first person he met that he had a "lemon," 
but thought that (1) would be a better expression for con-
veying what he wanted to say? It might be objected that 
the stranger, at least, knew what he meant by uttering (1), 
and this is sufficient for (l)'s having been used to make a 
statement. But can a person make a statement if he is 
addressing someone who does not understand what he means? 
26 
He can try to make a statement. A person often searches for 
"the right words," using first one form of expression and 
then another until he hits upon one which enables him to 
say what he has been trying to say. He succeeds in saying 
what he has been trying to say only when the person or per-
sons (or, at least, some of them) whom he is addressing come 
to understand what he means. 1 That a person cannot make a 
' statement unless those whom he is addressing are capable 
of understanding what he means is even clearer. Can a per-
son talk to a drapery hook? Can he even try to talk to a 
drapery hook? He can, of course, go through the motions--he 
can utter words while in its presence. I am not saying that 
there must always be someone else whom a person is addressing 
if he is to succeed in making a statement. A person can talk 
to himself, tell himself things. But this consideration is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the stranger who, in 
my example, came up to me and uttered (1) had succeeded 
1rt might be thought that a person can succeed in mak-
ing a statement if someone who overhears his words under-
stands what he means even though the person or persons ad-
dressed do not. But it is more natural to describe this 
case as one in which the overhearer knows what the speaker 
is trying to say rather than what the speaker is saying. 
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in making a statement. For he was not telling himself that 
he had a toothache. 
Now the circumstances in which (1) can be used to 
state that I have a toothache are not circumstances in which 
(2) can be used to make a statement. If I had been acting 
irritably, or turned down an invitation, or made an appoint-
ment with the dentist, I could use (1) to inform someone who 
wondered what was up that I had a toothache. But in these 
circumstances, to what question could (2) be used to give an 
answer? What possible information could (2) be used to con-
vey? In the circumstances of ordinary life where (1) has 
its home, (2) has no use. Indeed, if someone were to come 
up to me and utter (2) outside a philosophical context, I 
would be at a loss as to what he meant. If this is true, 
however, then I do not see how it can be maintained that 
statements expressed by sentences such as (1) commit those 
who assert them to the statement expressed by (2). If (2) 
fails to express a statement in the circumstances in which 
(1) succeeds in expressing the statement that I have a tooth-
ache, it would seem that the use of (1) carries with it no 
such existential commitment. Or if it does, this would at 
the very least be a queer sort of commitment. Such queerness, 
however, does not affect the transition from (3) to (4). 
I think it is plain.that the circumstances in which (3) 
can be used to state that those tracks were made by elec-
trons are circumstances in which (4) also has a use. In-
deed, one could easily imagine a discussion between adher-
ents of the corpuscular interpretation of quantum physics 
and adherents of the wave interpretation in which both 
(3) and (4) were used to make statements. 
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It may be objected to the foregoing that statements 
expressed by sentences such as {l) must carry with them 
existential commitment regarding pains. If the words "a 
toothache" in {l) were not used in such a way that they pur-
port to designate an object distinct from the person utter-
ing (1), there would be nothing for {l) to be about and 
hence it would be meaningless. But this is not true. 
Consider the sentence 
{5) The grocer had a glimpse of the man who stole 
Smith's wallet. 
(5) does not express a statement about the man who stole 
Smith's wallet, but about the grocer's glimpse of this man. 
Now clearly it is implausible to say that (5) commits the 
person uttering it to a belief in the existence of glimpses. 
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The v.-ords "a glimpse" need not ostensibly refer to an object 
distinct from the grocer in order that there be something 
for (5) to be about. The genitive inflection in the phrase 
"the grocer's glimpse" does not signify the relation of be-
longing to, as it does in the phrase, "the grocer's apron," 
but rather the manner in which the grocer saw the man who 
stole Smith's wallet. 1 The proper analysis of (5) is not 
(g~) (g~) (a~) (~ is the grocer & ~ is the man who stole 
Smith's wallet & z is a glimpse of ~ & x had ~) 
1It may be said that although the grocer does not 
have a glimpse in the same sense in which he has an apron, 
it does not follow that the gentive inflection in the phrase 
"the grocer's glimpse" does not signify the relation of be-
longing to. It could be that the grocer has a glimpse only 
in virtue of having something else, viz., an act of seeing, 
in the sense in which he has an apron. But this suggestion 
is implausible for two reasons. First, there is no ordi~ 
nary sense of the expressions "having," "possessing," and 
"belonging to" in which it makes sense to speak of "having 
an act of seeing" or "possessing an act of seeing" or 
"an act of seeing belonging to someone." It is true that 
these former expressions can be given a sense which make 
these latter expressions meaningful. Since, however, it 
does make sense to speak of "having an apron" or "possessing 
an apron" or "an apron belonging to someone" in the ordi-
nary sense of "having," "possessing," and "belonging to," 
it follows that the given sense of these latter expressions 
would not be the sense in which the grocer has an apron. 
Second, the grocer has an apron in a sense in which it is 
possible for the apron not to belong to anyone at all. But 
it is implausible to maintain that the grocer can "have" 
an act of seeing in a sense in which it is possible for the 
act of seeing not to belong to anyone at all. These remarks 
apply mutatis mutandis to the expressions "having a tooth-
ache" and 11 feeITng nauseous" which I assimilate in the 
text to "having a glimpse." 
but rather 
(~x) (~~) (~ is the grocer & ~ is the man who stole 
Smith's wallet & x saw~ fleetingly). 
Analogously, it is quite possible that the proper analysis 
of sentences such as (1) will assimilate them to sentences 
such as 
(6) I am feeling nauseous. 
The expression "have a toothache" on such an analysis will 
not be further analyzable and will serve merely to charac-
terize a way of being conscious. 
Rorty avoids these difficulties connected with Feyer-
abend' s version of eliminative materialism by maintaining 
that words for sensations are observation-terms, although, 
indeed, he insists that "the distinction between observa-
tion-terms and non-observation-terms is relative to lin-
guistic practices (practices which may change as inquiry 
progresses) On this position, however, there 
seems to be no way of reconciling the intuitive implausi-
bility of saying that people who report sensations hold 
false beliefs with the claim that there are no such things 
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111Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," p. 40. 
... 
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as sensations. To claim that there are no such things as 
that to which an observation-term purports to refer seems 
to imply that people who report them hold false beliefs. 
Thus, for example, to claim that there are no unicorns 
seems to imply that people who say such things as "I chased 
a unicorn out of my clover-patch yesterday" hold false be-
liefs. Accordingly, Rorty argues that this implication does 
not hold with respect to sensations. His argument consists 
in sketching a general theory of the conditions under which 
such an implication does not hold. The theory-sketch is 
this. 
(1) X's are the subjects of both inferential and non-
inferential reports; (2) empirical discoveries are 
made which enable us to subsume X-laws under Y-laws 
and to produce new X-laws by studying Y's; (3) infer-
ential reports of X1 s cease to be madeT (4) non-inferen-
tial reports of X's are reinterpreted either (4a) as 
reports of Y's, or (4b) as reports of mental entities 
(thoughts that one is seeing an X, hallucinatory images, 
etc.); (5) non-inferential reports of X's cease to be 
made (because their place is taken by non-inferential 
reports either of Y's or of thoughts, hallucinatory 
images, etc.); (6)-we conclude that there simply are 
no such things as X's.l 
I want to begin my discussion of Rorty's version of elimina-
tive materialism with an examination of this theory. In 
particular, I want to examine stage (2) of the theory. For 
1
rbid., pp. 35-36. 
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stage (2) to have an application to the case of sensations, 
there must be such things as sensation-laws which occur 
essentially in sensation-explanations. But what are sensa-
tion-laws? It is worthy of note that Rorty does not provide 
us with any examples of such laws. In fact, there is a 
marked scarcity of such examples in recent materialist litera-
ture. Scientific materialists should find this scarcity em-
barrassing, since it only serves to strengthen the convic-
tion of their opponents that sensation-statements play a dif-
ferent role in our lives, have a different use, than do 
neurophysiological statements and hence that sensation-laws, 
if there are such, are not statements of a type which can 
be subsumed under neurophysiological laws. 
To clear up this question, it will be useful to call to 
mind the sorts of things which go under the heading of "sen-
sations." Besides pain, there are the sorts of things which 
make up the well-known list assembled by Gilbert Ryle in 
The Concept of Mind: 1 thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, 
wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms, 
hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings and 
1 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 83-84. 
shocks. Now what does a throb-law look like? I cannot 
think of any. Is this because throb-laws are so terribly 
complicated that no one has yet been able to formulate one 
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of them with sufficient precision? But then how is it possi-
ble for them to occur essentially in explanations which even 
the most untutored persons can understand, as when someone 
asks me why I shook my head like that and I say that I felt 
a sudden throbbing in my right ear? Or is it that throb-
laws are so terribly obvious that no one has yet bothered 
to formulate one of them? Then it ought to be easy to think 
up one. Here is a candidate. 
(L.l) Anyone who feels an unpleasant throbbing in his 
ear will shake his head in such-and-such a 
manner. 
The trouble with this candidate is that it is false. A per-
son might rub his ear instead. Suppose we replace (L.1) 
by a slightly more complicated candidate. 
(L.2) Anyone who feels an unpleasant throbbing in his 
ear and thinks that shaking his head in such-
and-such a manner will be the best way to remove 
it, will shake his head in such-and-such a man-
ner. 
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The trouble with (L.2} is that it seems to be restricted 
to cases in which the sufferer deliberates over a number of 
possibilities until he decides upon one and then carries 
out his decision. But in most cases nothing of the sort 
happens. In fact, in most cases of a person's shaking his 
head because of a throbbing in his ear, the person is not 
thinking of anything at all, or, at least, not of anything 
related to the throbbing. He feels the throbbing and just 
shakes his head. There are some cases, indeed, in which 
the person is so engrossed in what he is doing, as when he is 
playing chess, that he does not realize that he has shaken 
his head until someone asks him why he has. Suppose now 
that instead of replacing (L.l} by a more complicated candi-
date, we replace it by one that is more general. 
(.L.3} Anyone who feels an unpleasant throbbing in 
his ear will tend to do whatever is conducive 
to removing it. 
The objection to (L.3} is that it could not possibly be 
true. For there are many different and incompatible things 
conducive to removing an unpleasant throbbing in the ear. 
Perhaps the followi~g will do: 
(L. 4) J>...nyone who feels cm unpleasant throbbing in 
his ear will tend to do something conducive 
to removing it. 
But (L.4) does not explain why the person shook his head 
rather than, say, rub his ear. The reason why throb-laws 
are so hard to find is not that they are too obvious for 
anyone to have thought it worth the effort to formulate 
them. 
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The same considerations apply mutatis.mutandis to pang-
laws, pricking-laws, curdling-laws, etc. Of the sensations 
which make up Ryle's list, itches seem to be least objec-
tionable as subjects of possible laws. When someone asks 
me why I am rubbing my nose and I reply that I have an 
itch, it seems not too implausible to say that my reply 
serves as an explanation only if it makes a tacit appeal 
to some such law as 
(L.5) People who have itches tend to scratch the 
place that itches. 
I think, however, that the case for the essential occur-
rence of itch-laws in itch-explanations stands or falls 
with the case for the essential occurrence of other sorts 
of sensation-laws in sensation-explanations. The sensation-
explanations for which it is most plausible to claim a 
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tacit appeal to sensation-laws are pain-explanations. This 
is no doubt one of the reasons why pains have received so 
much attention in recent materialist literature. Itches 
seem to stand somewhere between throbs and pangs on the one 
hand and pains on the other in an ascending order of plausi-
ble candidates for subjects of possible laws. The considera-
tions which weigh in favor of pains would serve, I think, 
to balance the considerations deriving from throbs and pangs 
which weigh against itches. For this reason I want to turn 
now to pains. 
To the best of my knowledge, materialists have given 
only one explicit example of what is supposed to count as 
a pain-law. The example is this. 
(L.6) People tend to avoid things with which they have 
had painful experiences. 1 
A few other examples have been suggested. These are all of 
the following sort. 
(L. 7) 2 People in pain tend to cry out. 
1see Hilary Putnam, "Minds and Machines," in Sidney 
Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind (New York: New York Univer-
sity Press, 1960), p. 171.~~ 
2The expression "cry out" is not meant to be re-
stricted only to the cries, say, of a child, but includes 
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(L.8) People in pain tend to grimace. 
(L.6), (L.7), and (L.8) have a suspicious look about them 
which makes it doubtful whether they are statements of a 
kind that can be subsumed under neurophysiological laws. 1 
Before I explore this point, however, I want to call atten-
tion to the richness of pain~explanations, consequent upon 
the very important role they play in our lives, and to the 
' 
corresponding failure of this handful of examples adequately 
to represent the full range of pain-laws which, on the pres-
ent view, would have to be postulated. Consider the follow-
ing examples of pain-explanations: 
(E.l) He said that he felt bad because he was hilllgry 
and had a headache. 2 
(E.2) I declined the invitation because I had a head-
ache. 
within its range of application groans and exclamations such 
as "Ouch!" and "Oh, how my head hurts!" 
1Rorty never explains anywhere what he means by the sub-
sumption of one set of laws under another set of laws. I 
think it is clear, however, that he means at least that the 
subsumed laws are less basic or fundamental than the laws 
under which they are subsumed, in the sense that the former 
are dependent on the latter. 
2This example is Putnam's. See ibid., p. 170. 
(E.3) I won't be at the chess tournament tonight be-
cause I have a headache. 
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(E.4) I expected to pass out any minute because of the 
pain. 
(E.5) I finally promised her that I would hire someone 
to help me, because the pain involved in moving 
about continued to get worse. 
(E.6) His constant suffering wouldn't let me forget 
my guilt. 
(E.7) I prayed to God to end my life then, because I 
could no longer endure the suffering. 
(E.8) I gave him permission to amputate the foot be-
cause I could bear the pain no longer. 
(E.9) I ordered him to amputate the foot because of 
the pain I was in. 
(E.10) I sold my business because I was in too much pain 
to work any longer. 
(E.11) I finally married her, because the pain pre-
vented me from taking care of myself. 
Now it might be thought that no further laws need be postu-
lated for (E.1-11) than {L.6) or those irnrneqiately deriva-
ble from (L.6). But, firstt this is clearly not the case 
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for (E.4-6). Expecting to pass out any minute is not a way 
of avoiding painful experiences, although passing out is. 
Similarly, promising her that I would hire someone is not 
a way of avoiding painful experiences, although hiring some-
one is. And remembering my guilt is not a way of avoiding 
his pain or the pain I feel at his suffering. Even (E.l) 
seems to be an explanation to which (L.6) is irrelevant. One's 
' saying that he felt bad is not a way of avoiding his hunger 
and headache. Nor is (L.7) relevant to (E.l) in most cases. 
One's saying that he felt bad can sometimes be assimilated 
to the cry "Oh, how my head hurts!," but not always. 
Second, since pain-laws, on the present view, are state-
ments of a kind which can be subsumed under neurophysiologi-
cal laws, the expression "avoid things" in (L.6) would have 
to be capable of being spelled out in wholly neurophysiologi-
cal terms. But no statement or set of statements wholly in 
neurophysiological terms would be sufficient to explain the 
occurrence of the acts of avoidance in (E.8-11). Giving 
permission involves more than just saying "you may • • • " 
A child or a madman can say "You may amputate my foot," but 
the person to whom this is said does not thereby have the 
right to amputate. Or even a normal adult can say this to 
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someone whom he mistakenly believes to be a licensed physi-
cian, but it is clearly false that the person to whom this 
is said has been granted permission to amputate. A person 
can grant someone permission to amputate only if the former 
is legally of age and has not been judged legally insane, and 
the latter has been licensed to perform operations by a gov-
ernmental agency authorized to issue such licenses. To ex-
plain satisfactorily the occurrence of the act of avoidance 
in (E.8), therefore, the relevant pain-law would have to be 
capable of expansion into a statement which mentions such 
things as laws, customs, practices, authority, institutions, 
and, in general, an organized community. But it is difficult 
to see how these sorts of things could be spelled out in 
wholly neurophysiological terms. How, for example, could 
the law that people become responsible for their actions at 
the age of 21 consist in "the firing of C-fibers?" Analogous 
considerations apply to (E.9-11). I cannot order someone 
to do something unless I am in a position of authority. A 
ship's-captain who has just been wounded can order a ship's-
doctor to amputate his foot, but a petty officer cannot. 
Now how could the authority to order the ship's-doctor to 
amputate one's foot be a discharge of neurons or consist in 
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the firing of C-fibers? Further, to be in such a position 
of authority presupposes the existence of military laws and 
institutions, which would, accordingly, also have to be capa-
ble of expression in wholly neurophysiological terms. Again, 
selling one's business involves more than just accepting some 
pieces of metal and paper and then walking away. The act of 
avoidance mentioned in (E.10) essentially involves the notions 
' of a contract and money. But a piece of paper with writing 
on it is not a contract outside an organized community in 
which there are laws, government, etc. And pieces of metal 
and paper are not money apart from the existence of financial 
institutions. That (E.11) does not differ in this respect 
from (E.8-10) is obvious; marrying someone involves more 
than merely saying 11 I do. 11 
So far I have been concentrating on explanations which 
presuppose the existence of a social community with its rules, 
customs, and institutions. It would not be difficult, how-
ever, to extend these remarks to explanations which presup-
pose the existence of a moral or religious community. Con-
sider, for example, (E. 5-7). (E.5) and (E.6) are explana-
tions, as I have pointed out above, to which (L.6) is irrele-
vant. It does not follow, of course, that they are 
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explanations to which no pain-laws would be relevant. But 
any statement which might plausibly be claimed to be a 
pain-law occurring essentially in (E.5) or (E.6) would have 
to be capable of expansion into a statement which mentioned 
moral responsibility and moral rules, duties, and rights. 
To explain the memory of my guilt, for example, is not just 
to explain the memory of his suffering or even the memory 
of having injured him. Similarly, praying to God involves 
more than just saying "Please, dear God, • ·• • • 11 Even a 
savage can be trained to say these words, but is he then 
praying? I am not saying that savages cannot pray, or even 
that they do not pray. Nor am I saying that some of the ex-
pressions they employ in the course of praying cannot be 
translated into the words "Please, dear God, II But 
should we happen upon someone belonging to a tribe unac-
quainted with any form of worship and train him to say these 
words and to perform all the appropriate physical movements 
and even have all the appropriate mental accompaniments, we 
would still not have the right to say that he was praying. 
. . ( . t"t . ) 1 Praying is a custom a use, an ins i ution • One might 
1cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, secs. 
199-200. 
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grant that a statement or set of statements wholly in neuro-
physiological terms would be sufficient to explain the oc-
currence of the act of saying, "Please, dear God • II 
but how could such a statement or statements explain the 
existence of the custom of saying these words? And need one 
. grant even this much? Saying, "Please, dear God, • . . . " in-
volves more than just uttering certain noises. Uttering 
these noises is saying something only if a place is already 
prepared for them in a language, and language is essentially 
interwoven with shared activities and presupposes agreement 
. "t 1 in 1 s use. In short, saying something presupposes the 
existence of an organized community. This point about the 
nature of language has a significance which extends beyond 
(E.7). It shows that the claim that there is a statement or 
set of statements in wholly neurophysiological terms suffi-
cient to account for the occurrence of the event explained 
in (E.l) is vulnerable to the same sorts of objections which 
have just been raised in connection with (E.5-11), and even 
casts doubt on analogous claims vis-a-vis (E.3} and (E.4). 
(E.3} is not a prediction but a statement of intention. 
1ct. ibid., secs. 241-42. 
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I am not predicting that I won't be at the chess tournament 
tonight because I observe that I have a headache and remem-
ber that whenever I had a headache in the past I stayed home. 
Now what is it like for me to intend not to be there tonight? 
Perhaps I say to myself or someone else, "I'll not go." Or 
I imagine myself there tonight and shake my head. Or I do 
not think about it at all but just stay home or go elsewhere. 
But intending not to be at the chess tournament tonight in-
volves more than just uttering these words or shaking my 
head while imagining myself there or staying home. Not being 
there is the fulfillment of intending not to be there, 
but it is not the fulfillment of these events. It is not 
clear whether it even makes sense to speak of these events 
as having a fulfillment. To try to avoid this objection by 
pushing the intention back from these events to the brain 
processes which are their causes would be futile. For speak-
ing of a brain process as having been fulfilled would seem 
to make sense only if it is another way of saying that the 
brain process has been completed. It is in language that 
uttering these words or shaking my head while imagining 
myself there or stating home makes contact with not being 
there. In any case, intending not to be at the chess 
tournament tonight presupposes the existence of the tech-
nique of the game of chess; and this in turn presupposes 
the existence of the custom of playing games. Again, what 
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is it like for me to expect to pass out? I say perhaps "I 
think I'm going to pass out." Or I simply grab hold of the 
nearest chair to steady myself. These events or even their 
neurophysiological causes are not my expectation of passing 
out, however, for passing out fulfills the latter but (logi-
cally) cannot fulfill the former. Only in language do these 
events and passing out make contact. It seems, therefore, 
that none of the events explained in (E.1-11) are such that 
statements in wholly neurophysiological terms would be suf fi-
cient to explain their occurrence. That (E.2) does not dif-
fer in this respect is plain. I cannot decline an invita-
tion unless there is the custom of extending and accepting 
invitations. 
I have been arguing so far that, on the view that there 
are pain-laws occurring essentially in pain-explanations, 
the pain-laws which would have to be postulated to do jus-
tice to the richness of pain-explanations in ordinary life 
would have to be capable of expansion into ~tatements which 
mentioned such things as laws, customs, practices, authority, 
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institutions, and, in general, an organized community. My 
purpose has been to cast doubt on the idea that such laws 
would be statements of a kind which can be subsumed under 
neurophysiological laws. Now it might be maintained that al-
though these pain-laws would be difficult to analyze in 
wholly neurophysiological terms, to do so would in principle 
be possible and this is all that the present view really re-
quires. But, first, in view of this difficulty, the burden 
of proof would seem to be on the materialist to show that it 
is in principle possible to analyze such things as laws, cus-
toms, etc., in neurophysiological terms. A few examples, of 
even the most elementary sort, would be helpful; yet none 
seem to be forthcoming. Second, there is some reason to think 
that such an analysis would not be possible even in principle. 
I have in mind the essential vagueness of the events commonly 
explained in pain-explanations. If promising, ordering, 
giving permission, etc., were in principle analyzable into 
neurophysiological processes, then, since the latter either 
occur or do not occur, the former would either occur or not 
occur. But the law of excluded middle does not seem to ap-
ply to the occurrence of the former events •. Consider prom-
ises, for example. The promise mentioned in (E.5) could 
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have been given in a form of words prefixed by "I promise" 
but need not have been. All that might have been said was 
11 0kay, I'll hire someone. 11 Now what made these words the 
expression of a promise? The situation and its antecedents--
the whole history of the incident. But the situation could 
have left it open which way these words were to be taken. 
(Cf. breach of promise suits which call for a decision by the 
court.) Even when the "I promise" formula is used, it is 
sometimes not clear whether a promise has been given. Sup-
pose I say, "I promise ••• 11 when I am out of my head with 
pain. Did I promise? No one would say so. But there are 
transitional cases. At what point can one say, "It is 
exactly here, at this degree of suffering, that these words 
no longer count as the expression of a promise?" It is easy 
to see how these remarks apply to each one of the events ex-
plained in (E.1-11). Have I given permission to amputate 
my foot if I say, "Go ahead" when I am delirious with pain? 
At what point do I not do so? Marriage in some places is 
effected by cohabiting, but after exactly how much time--in 
days, minutes, and seconds? A captain can order a lieuten-
ant to do something--but when they are both.prisoners of 
w·ar? Here, regulations had to be devised in order to decid~ 
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the question. Is it mutiny when the crew refuses the crazed 
captain's demand to turn their guns on ships of their own 
fleet? Do I ~ that I feel bad if I mumble the words, "I 
feel bad" while in deep sleep? None of these questions would 
call for decisions if the events mentioned were analyzable in 
principle into neurophysiological processes but rather for 
further research--for further observation and experiment. 
I want to turn now from the sorts of laws which would 
have to be postulated to explain the occurrence of the events 
explained in (E.1-11) to the relatively simple laws (L.6-8). 
These laws, as I mentioned earlier, have a suspicious look 
about them which makes it doubtful whether they are state-
ments of a kind that can be subsumed under neurophysiological 
laws. The feature to which I refer is that they all appear 
to be a priori propositions. If {L.6-8) are a priori proposi-
tions, then, since neurophysiological laws are contingent 
propositions, (L.6-8) cannot be dependent on such laws. 1 
A priori propositions express connections which cannot be 
confirmed or refuted by experience (although some a priori 
propositions, e.g., "Demons are intangible," can be shown 
1 Cf. supra, p. 37, n. 1. 
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to have no application to experience) and, hence, which can-
not be dependent on correlations expressed by contingent 
laws. Consider (L.6), for example. (L.6) is true a priori, 
not because of its form but because of its meaning--that is, 
because of the connection between the concept of pain and 
avoidance-behavior. 1 Thus, (L.6) is true a priori, not 
1The propositions (1) "No unmarried man is married" and 
(2) "No bachelor is married" are both true a priori proposi-
tions, that is, true propositions not open to confirmation 
or refutation by experience. (1), however, is true by vir-
tue of its form alone, while (2) is true by virtue of the 
meaning of its non-logical terms. Thus (1) is a substitu-
tion instance of the tautologous propositional form "No non-
A is A," while the propositional form of which (2) is an in-
stance, viz., "No A is B," is not tautologous. The tautolo-
gousness of "No non-A is A" resides in its property of hav-
ing only true substitution instances, a property which "No 
A is B" clearly lacks. To put the same point differently, 
Tl) is true and remains true under any and all reinterpre-
tations of its non-logical terms; (2), however, although 
true, does not remain true under any and all reinterpreta-
tions of its non-logical terms. Now just as (2) is true by 
virtue of the meaning of its non-logical terms, (L.6) is al-
so true by virtue of the meaning of its non-logical terms. 
But the truth of (L.6) does not depend on the meaning of its 
non-logical terms in the same way that (2) does. The truth 
of (2) depends on the relation of cognitive synonymy, which 
may for present purposes be explicated as follows: "A" and 
"B" are cognitively synonymous if and only if necessarily 
all and only those things of which "A" is truly predicable 
are things of which "B" is truly predicable. Now it is not 
true that necessarily-all and only those. things of which 
"pain" is truly predicable are things of which "avoidance-
behavior" is truly predicable, especially if it be thought 
sensible (which I doubt) to predicate "pain" of three-
dimensional "time slices" of four-dimensional space-time 
entities. The meaning-relation on which the truth of (L.6) 
depends is much more complicated. Let "meaning-relationL.6" 
stand for this meaning-relation. Then, crudely formulat-
ed, meaning-relationL. 6 is as follows: 11 ~" and "B" are 
meaning-relatedL 6 if and only if necessarily there are some things 
of which "A" is "(truly or falsely) predicable only if most 
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because it remains true under any and all reinterpreta~ions 
of its non-logical terms, but because if someone in normal 
circumstances (that is, not while rehearsing a play, under 
hypnosis, drugged, etc.) were sincerely to self-apply the 
word "pain" or one of its cognates in the absence of appro-
priate simultaneous or subsequent avoidance-behavior, it 
would not be clear what he was using this word to mean. If 
someone in normal circumstances 'were sincerely to utter the 
words "My foot is very sore," for example, but showed no 
fear of or made no objection to an inconsiderate handling 
of his foot, it would be difficult to guess what he could 
mean. We could, of course, test his knm-lledge of the lan-
guage--and even find out that he was using these words cor-
rectly. This would be a case, then, in which pain did occur 
in the absence of simultaneous or subsequent avoidance-
behavior. But how would we find out that he was using 
these words correctly? That he is able to define "sore" in 
terms of "pain" or its other cognates would not be helpful, 
things of which "A" is truly predicable are things of which 
11 B" is truly predicable. The notion of necessity employed 
here is not that of logical entailment. I try to explicate 
this notion as well as refine the foregoing crude formula-
tion of meaning-relationL.G in Chapter III. 
51 
for what we would want to know is whether he understood the 
meaning of any of these terms. The only way of finding this 
out, it seems, would be to observe his application of these 
words in circumstances in which either he or someone else 
is exhibiting the appropriate avoidance-behavior. 1 Thus 
although any proposition of the form "~ is in pain but does 
not and will not exhibit avoidance-behavior" is open to con-
firmation or refutation by experience and, hence, is a con-
tingent proposition, "pain" and its cognates presuppose the 
existence of circumstances in which pain occurs together with 
simultaneous or subsequent avoidance-behavior for their mean-
ing. The concept of pain, that is, presupposes the exis-
tence of such circumstances. 
To the foregoing it might be objected, as it has been, 2 
that one need not observe how someone applies a word in 
paradigm cases to find out whether he understands its 
meaning; it would be possible, at least in principle, to find 
1The avoidance-behavior would not be appropriate if it 
consisted in, say, showing fear of or making objection to an 
inconsiderate handling of one's hand. 
2see Hilary Putnam, "Brains and Behavior," in R. J. 
Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, II (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1965), pp. 1-19. 
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this out by examining (e.g.) his brain processes or the elec-
trical waves emanating from his brain. The general reply to 
this objection has already been anticipated in my previous 
remarks about the nature of language. The meaning of a word 
is determined by the rules governing its use. But it is 
difficult to see how these rules could be brain processes 
or electrical waves. For they presuppose the existence of an 
' organized community, with its laws, customs, practices, and 
institutions. Further, these rules are essentially vague. 
The use of most of our words is never completely determined; 
there are always borderline cases which call for decision 
rather than for application of the appropriate rule. But 
brain processes or waves are not in this way vague, if, in-
deed it makes sense to speak of them as being vague at all. 
I think this general reply to the objection is sufficient, 
but a limited reply can also be made which grants the possi-
bility of finding out whether someone understands the meaning 
of a word by examining his brain processes or brain waves. 
That certain brain processes or brain waves were evidence 
for a_ given person's understanding the meaning of the word 
"pain" could be established only by observation of correla-
tions between brain processes or brain waves of the same 
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kind belonging to other persons and the presence in them of 
such understanding. 1 But then the way of telling whether a 
given person understands the meaning of "pain" which consists 
in examining his brain processes or brain waves would presup-
pose the existence of some other way of telling whether a 
person understands the meaning of "pain. 112 Now this other 
way of telling, it seems, would have either to consist in 
observing how a person applies "pain" in circumstances in 
which he or someone else is exhibiting the appropriate avoid-
ance-behavior or, at least, ultimately presuppose this way 
of telling. It is important to notice that this limited 
reply to the objection under discussion cannot stand alone 
but must finally fall back upon considerations relevant to 
the general reply. For a possible rejoinder to the former 
1Even Putnam admits this much. See ibid., pp. 14-17. 
2It does not follow, of course, that this other way of 
telling would have to be capable of successful employment 
with respect to every person. Thus, the way of telling 
whether a given person understands the meaning of "pain" 
which consists in examining his brain processes or brain 
waves would not presuppose the existence of some other way 
of telling whether that person understands the meaning 
of "pain." Whatever plausibility Putnam's argument has de-
rives from this consideration. Putnam assumes a community 
of "super-super-spartans" with respect to which any other 
way of telling could not be successfully employed. 
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is that one could conceivably establish that certain brain 
processes or brain waves are evidence for a given person's 
understanding the meaning of "pain" by observing correla-
tions between brain processes or brain waves of the same 
kind and the presence of such understanding in one's own 
case. Thus one might attach some suitable electrical detect-
ing instrument to one's own skull and observe the patterns 
it records when one is using the word "pain" to say some-
thing. But surely, the rejoinder continues, I need not ob-
serve how I apply "pain" in circumstances in which I or some-
one else exhibits the appropriate avoidance-behavior to find 
out whether I understand what •:pain" means. The most effec-
tive way to counter this move, I believe, is to point out 
that one knows that one understands the meaning of the word 
"pain" only if it is true that one understands it, that is, 
only if the concept of understanding the meaning of the word 
"pain" truly applies in one's case. And the range of appli-
cation of a concept is determined by rules governing the use 
of the expression for that concept. Without such rules it 
makes no sense either to affirm or deny that a concept truly 
applies to a given case. Now rules of language are essen-
tially interwoven with shared act.jvities made possible by 
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agreement in behavior. 1 And particular kinds of rules are 
essentially interwoven with shared activities made possible 
by agreement in particular kinds of behavior. Among the par-
ticular kinds of behavior which in fact underlie the activi-
ties interwoven with rules governing the use of the expres-
sion "understanding the meaning of the word 'pain'" is avoid-
ance-behavior. 
Grimacing and crying out while in pain are also part of 
the circumstances whose existence is presupposed by the con-
cept of pain. Thus (L.7) and (L.8) are true a priori in the 
same way that (L.6) is. The former are true a priori, not 
because it is impossible for pain to occur in the absence of 
. grimacing or crying out, but because if someone in normal 
circumstances (that is, not while rehearsing a play, under 
hypnosis, drugged, etc.) were sincerely to self-apply the 
word "pain" or one of its cognates in the absence of grimac-
ing and crying out, it would not be clear what he was using 
this word to mean. If someone in normal circumstances were 
sincerely to utter the words, "I have a headache" or "I 
1c£. Wittgenstein's remark, "If a lion.could talk, 
we could not understand him," ~· cit., p. 223. 
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have a toothache," for example, but did not exhibit sig-ns 
of unusual irritability, it would be difficult to guess what 
he could mean. 1 We could, of course, test his knowledge 
of the language--and even find out that he was using these 
words correctly. But the way of finding this out, it seems, 
would have to consist in observing his application of these 
words in circumstances in which he or someone else is grimac-
\ 
ing and crying out (as well as exhibiting the appropriate 
avoidance-behavior}, or, if one accepts the examination of 
his brain processes or brain waves as a possible test, would 
have to presuppose the existence of circumstances in which 
(at least) someone applied these words while grimacing and 
crying out (as well as exhibiting the appropriate avoidance-
behavior}. 
It will be useful to summarize the general argument of 
this chapter. Most kinds of sensations make implausible 
candidates for subjects of possible laws. The few kinds 
1one can, indeed, sincerely utter these words in the 
course of teaching someone else their meaning or by way of 
giving an example, say, in a philosophical discussion. But 
then one is not self-applying pain-words at all. One is not 
using these words to say that one is in pain, because one 
is not using them to say anything. In such cases, they are 
merely being mentioned. 
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of sensations which do not are such that the laws in which 
they might most plausibly be claimed to occur as subjects 
either would have to be capable of expansion into statements 
which mention such things as laws, customs, practices, author-
ity, institutions, and, in general, an organized community, 
or else would be a priori propositions. 1 In either case 
it is difficult to see how these laws could be subsumed under 
neurophysiological laws. But if they cannot, then Rorty 
has failed to show that the central claim of eliminative mate-
rialism, viz. that there are no such things as sensations, 
does not have the intuitively implausible consequence that 
people who report sensations hold false beliefs. For stage 
(2) of the general theory he sketches of the conditions 
under which such an implication does not hold has no applica-
tion to the case of sensations. Further, it does not seem 
possible to explain away the implausibility of this conse-
quence, as Feyerabend tries to do, by assimilating the ordi-
nary language of sensations to an all-pervasive scientific 
theory. This approach seems merely to replace the 
1rt should be plain that the argument for the a priori 
character of the pain-laws, {L.6-8), applies mutatis mutan-
dis to the itch-law, {L.5). 
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implausibility of saying that people who report sensations 
hold false beliefs by the implausibility of the consequences 
which follow upon such an assimilation. 
CHAPTER III 
SENSATION-EXPLANATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL REVISION 
In my last chapter, I presented a number of examples 
to show that sensation-statements play a different role in 
our lives, have a different use, than do neurophysiological 
statements and drew the consequence that sensation-laws, if 
there are such, are not statements of a type which can be 
subsumed under neurophysiological laws. Scientific mate-
rialists could easily grant the soundness of this argument, 
however, without sacrificing anything essential to their 
position. As things stand now, they could say, sensation-
statements play a different role than do neurophysiological 
statements, and sensation-laws cannot be subsumed under neuro-
physiological laws. But the role that a given type of 
statement plays is determined by the placed prepared for it 
in a conceptual scheme, and conceptual schemes can be re-
vised. That we do now operate with a conceptual scheme hav-
ing the above features is to be attributed to the present 
stage of empirical inquiry. Should there be significant 
. scientific advances of the appropriate sort in the future, 
it would be reasonable to revise our conceptual scheme so 
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as to eliminate these features. That Rorty would be prepared 
to fall back upon such an argument if he came to doubt the 
feasibility of subsuming sensation-laws under neurophysiologi-
cal laws is clear from the pragmatic strain running through 
his many writings on the subject. He would then still be 
left with the problem of showing that the central claim of 
eliminative materialism does not have the implausible conse-
quence that people who report sensations hold false beliefs. 
In what follows, I propose to examine the claim that it 
would be reasonable in the light of future scientific ad-
vances of the appropriate sort to revise our conceptual 
scheme in such a way that the role played by sensation-
statements in our lives could be taken over by neuro-
physiological statements. 
I want to consider first the nature of the relation be-
tween pain and wanting. Aristotle held that pain and want-
ing are necessarily connected. In the course of discussing 
whether the soul is distinguishable into parts and, if so, 
in what sense, he says: 
[W]here there is sensation, there is also pleasure and 
pain, and, where these, necessarily also desire.l 
1 De An. 413b 22-23. 
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The notion of necessary connection is notoriously vague 
and shot through with difficulties, and it is not at all 
clear in this passage what Aristotle has in mind. From some 
of his later remarks it would be reasonable to assume that 
he is setting forth a mechanistic theory of what sets a 
human being in physical motion. Such an interpretation would 
be warranted by the following passages: 
[W]hen the object [of perception] is pleasant or ~ain­
ful, the soul ••• pursues or avoids the object. 
[T]here is a justification for regarding these two as 
the sources of movement, i.e., appetite and practical 
thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement 
and as a result of that thought gives rise to a move-
ment, the object of appetite being to it a source of 
stimulation. So too when the imagination originates move-
ment, it necessarily involves appetite • • • • [M]ind 
is never found producing movement without appetite ••• , 
but appetite can originate movement contrary to calcu-
lation, for desire is a form of appetite.2 
This way of explaining the connection between pain and 
wanting is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. We 
find it, for example, in both Descartes and Hume. Descartes 
concludes his Meditations with a crude mechanistic explana-
tion of why "those who when they are sick desire to drink 
or eat things hurtful to them. 113 Even in sick people, he 
1oe An. 43la 8-9. 2 De An. 433a 18-26. 
3Meditations,. IV, in The Philosophical Works of 
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notes, the sensation of thirst causes the desire to drink 
which in turn causes the body to be impelled to drink, just 
as pain in the foot excites the mind to do its utmost to 
remove the cause of the evil as dangerous and hurtful to 
the foot. Again, in The Passions of the Soul, Descartes 
sketches the mechanism whereby anticipation of pain causes 
fear which in turn causes the desire to flee which in turn 
causes the body to be impelled to flee. 1 Hume offers a simi-
lar account of the relation between pain and wanting. "'Tis 
obvious," he says, 
• • • that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure 
from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aver-
sion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or em-
brace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfac-
tion. 2, 3 
And in another passage: 
DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply, and AVERSION 
Descartes, trans. Elizabeth s. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross 
(2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
I, 194 (cited hereafter as the "HR" translation). 
1The Passions of the Soul, I, 35-40 (HR, I, 347-50). 
2A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 414. (cited 
hereafter as Treatise). 
3Like Aristotle and Descartes (see The Passions of the 
Soul, II, 86-87 (HR, I, 369-70), I am classifying aversion 
asa kind of desire; it is a desire to avoid what is painful. 
is deriv'd from evil. The WILL exerts itself, when 
either the good or the absence of the evil may be 
attain'd by any action of the mind or body.l 
Let us call the interpretation of "necessary connec-
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tion" based on the mechanistic model presented in these pas-
sages the "causal interpretation." To say that pain is neces-
sarily connected with wanting, on this interpretation, is to 
say that pain is causally connected with wanting. I wish 
to emphasize that I am not offering an analysis of what is 
sometimes meant by the phrase "necessary connection" but mere-
ly giving a name to one type of connection it is commonly 
used to denote. The notion of causal connection is not 
much less obscure than that of necessary connection. Indeed, 
there are current analyses of both notions according to which 
it would be incorrect to classify the former under the lat-
ter. As obscure as the notion of causal connection is, how-
ever, it will suffice for the purpose of distinguishing the 
sorts of necessary connection I intend to discuss below. 
Now the causal interpretation of the necessary connection 
held to obtain between pain and wanting has, I think, little 
to recommend it. First, the mechanistic model associated 
1Treatise, p. 439. By "good" and "evil," Hume tells 
us immediately afterwards he means, respectively, the 
sensations of pleasure and pain. 
64 
with this interpretation does not seem to fit many ordinary 
cases of avoiding what is painful or what gives some pros-
pect of being painful. Suppose I jump back suddenly upon 
brushing against a hot stove. Certainly it was the pain that 
made me jump. But need there have been a desire to jump 
interposed between the pain and my jumping? It would clearly 
be unnatural to describe this case as one in which I felt a 
searing pain, I wanted to jump backwards, and then I jumped. 
Of course, this could have happened. If someone were forc-
ing me against the stove so that I could not move away, then 
it would be natural to describe me as wanting to move away. 
But notice the difference between the two cases. Again, if 
I jump backwards at the leap and bark of the crocodile, I 
need not have first wanted to jump, or even wanted to jump 
in jumping, but simply jumped. Secondly, even cases in 
which there is room for the notion of wanting to avoid what 
is painful or what gives the prospect of being painful are 
not cases in which there is a causal connection between pain 
and wanting. Suppose I want to leave unopened the package 
I receive because my friend has just warned me that it con-
tains a bomb. In this case, it is not the prospect of pain 
which has made me want not to open the box but my friend's 
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warning. To maintain on the contrary that it is the pros-
pect of pain which has caused my wanting not to open the box 
would be to confuse the cause of wanting with its object. 
Wittgenstein's remark about fear in the following passage 
applies mutatis mutandis to wanting: 
We should distinguish between the object of fear and 
the cause of fear. Thus a face which inspires fear 
or delight (the object of fear or delight) , is not on 
that account its cause, but--one might say--its 
target.l 
Thirdly, even cases in which what is painful or what gives 
the prospect of being painful is the cause of my wanting to 
avoid it are not cases in which there is a causal connection 
between pain and wanting. Consider again the case in which 
someone is forcing me against a hot stove. Suppose, further, 
that he does not know that the stove is hot and asks me why 
I want so much to move away from it. I would not reply "Be-
cause of the searing pain in my back," but rather, "Because 
the stove is hot." One might be tempted to make the follow-
ing objection: "But clearly it is not just because the stove 
is hot that you want to move away from it. The stove can be 
hot even though you do not want to move away from it. That 
1Phi·1osophical Investigations, sec. 4 76. 
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part of your body touching the stove might be anaesthetized 
so that you do not feel any pain." Now the most this objec-
tion could show is not that the searing pain in my back is 
the cause of my wanting to move away from the stove, but 
that it is part of the cause of my wanting to move away from 
the stove. For it would be possible to reply: "But clearly 
it is not just because of the searing pain in my back that I 
want to move away from the stove. I can have a searing pain 
in my back even though I do not want to move away from the 
stove. I might not be standing near the stove, or I might 
not think I am standing near the stove but near the radiator, 
or although I think I am standing near the stove I do not 
think that the stove is hot but that the pain in my back is 
due to the wrestling match I am engaged in, or •••• " But 
to infer that A is the cause of B from the premises that C 
is the cause of B and A is part of C is to commit a well-known 
fallacy. If the inference were valid, then one could cor-
rectly argue that since Antonius' eulogy of Caesar caused 
much unrest among the multitude and the statement, "I come 
to bury Caesar, not to praise him," was part of the eulogy, 
this statement caused much unrest among the multitude. I 
do not think, however, that the objection succeeds in 
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establishing even this much, viz. that the searing pain in 
my back was part of the cause of my wanting to move away 
from the stove. For it suggests that when I gave the heat 
of the stove as the cause of my wanting to move away from it, 
I expected my auditor to go through some sort of process of 
inference like the following: "Since the stove is hot and 
he is leaning against the stove, it follows that he has a 
pain in his back. Therefore, he wants to move away from the 
stove, because part of the total situation in which he finds 
himself is his having a pain in his back." But, of course, 
I do not expect him to go through any such process of infer-
ence. I would have had third-degree burns by the time he 
finished. If I had truly expected this, I would have said 
right out that I had a pain in my back without trying to test 
his intelligence. Further, if this case could be correctly 
described as one in which such a process of inference oc-
curred, the following conversation would have been reasona-
ble: "Yes, I know that the stove is hot and that you are 
leaning against it, But what has that got to do with your 
wanting to move away from it?" "What has that got to do with 
it?--It follows that I am in pain, you clod!" Such a 
conversation would be ridiculous. It would not be akin to a 
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conversation like: "Yes, I know that you have just looked 
at the barometer and saw that it was falling. But what has 
that got to do with your wanting to take your UJrhrella?" 
"A falling barometer means rain, you clod!" This conversa-
tion at least makes sense. The conversation about the stove 
would be more akin to that special sort of nonsense which 
Lewis Carroll immortalized in "The Mad Tea-Party." 
The claim that there is a necessary connection between 
pain and wanting seems to be false on the causal interpreta-
tion of necessary connection. We shall have to search for a 
different interpretation, then, if we are going to make out 
this claim. Although Aristotle, as we have seen, often 
talks as though it is the causal interpretation he has in 
mind when discussing the relation between pain and wanting, 
it is possible to discern another interpretation in his writ-
ings which, I believe, brings his claim closer to the truth. 
This second interpretation is suggested by the following 
passage: 
If any order of living things has the sensory, it must 
also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus 
of which desire, passion, and wish are the species; now 
all animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and 
whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain 
and therefore has pleasant and painfui objects present 
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to it, and wherever these are present, there is desire, 
for desire is just appetition of what is pleasant.l 
It is clear, I think, that Aristotle is doing something else 
in this passage than setting forth a causal mechanism. If it 
is not immediately clear, the context in which the passage 
occurs leaves no doubt. The problem to which Aristotle is 
addressing himself is the definition of soul. "It is evident 
that the way to give the most ad.equate definition of soul," 
he says, "is to seek in the case of each of its forms for 
2 the most appropriate definition." The appetitive soul is 
one of the specific forms of soul. And while the appetitive 
soul contains the attribute of sensation in its definition, 3 
that attribute contains the appetitive soul in its own defini-
t . 4 ion. Since pain is a species of sensation and desire an 
essential attribute of the appetitive soul, therefore, it 
would also follow that pain contains desire in its own defini-
tion. This does not mean, of course, that pain must be de-
sired but that whatever has the capacity for pain must also 
have the capacity for desire. This way of explaining the 
1oe An. 414b 1-5. 2oe An. 415a 12-13. 
3see De An. 414b 28-33. 
4c£. Aristotle's discussion of essential attributes 
which contain the subjects to which they belong in their 
own definitions, Post. ~· 73a 34-b 1. 
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connection between pain and wanting has also had its adher-
ents throughout the history of philosophy. One finds it 
clearly expressed in the following passages of Descartes: 
[The faculties of imagination and feeling] cannot be 
[clearly and distinctly] conceived apart from me, that 
is without an intelligent substance in which they re-
side, for • • • in their formal concept, some kind of 
intellection is comprised, from which I infer that they 
are distinct from me as its modes are from a thing.I 
[A]ll these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are 
in truth none other than certain confused modes of 
thought which are produced by the union and apparent 
intermingling of mind and body.2 
Let us call the interpretation of "necessary connec-
tion" occurring in these passages from Aristotle and Des-
cartes the "definitional interpretation." To say that pain 
is necessarily connected with wanting, on this interpreta-
tion, is to say that the concept of wanting is contained 
in the definition of "pain." Again, I wish it to be under-. 
stood that I am not offering an analysis of what is some-
times meant by the phrase "necessary connection" but merely 
1Meditations, VI {HR, 
pain as internal feelin'9=-
I, 153 and 189). 
I, 190). Descartes classifies 
Cf. Meditations, II and VI (HR, 
2Meditations, VI {HR, I, 192). To say that xis a 
mode of ~, as Descartes~ndicates in the first passage, is 
to say that x cannot be clearly and distinctly conceived 
apart from y~ although the converse does not hold. See 
also Principles of Philosophy, I, 61 (HR, I, 244-45). 
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. giving a name to one type of connection it is commonly used 
to denote. Like the notion of causal connection, the notion 
of definition is not much less obscure than that of neces-
sary connection. And the notion of containment to which I 
have just appealed goes no way, certainly, toward explicat-
ing that of definition. Even so, at the intuitive level 
there is a distinction between definitional connections and 
causal connections, and this is all the present argument re-
quires to mark off the two interpretations of "necessary con-
nection. 111 I wish, however, further to refine the defini-
tional interpretation of "necessary connection" by marking 
off two sub-classes--the analytic interpretation and what 
I shall later call the "conceptual interpretation." To say 
that pain is necessarily connected with wanting, on the 
analytic interpretation, is to say either that it cannot 
rationally be conceived that there is some individual in or 
1
rt is true that Aristotle accounts for the unity of 
a definition in terms of a causal connection between its 
elements. But this connection is not one of efficient 
causality, as it would have to be to warrant assimilating 
the interpretation of "necessary connection" based on the 
mechanistic model to the definitional interpretation. The 
genus of the definition, according to Aristotle, is the 
material cause which is determined to the species by its 
differentiae or, more properly, its last differentia, the 
formal causes or cause of the definition. See Met. Bk vii, 
ch. 12 and Bk. viii, ch. 6. 
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anticipating pain who wants nothing, that is, 
(A) '~ ( (~) ( (~ is in pain V ~ is anticipating pain) :::i 
{3:Y) {~wants~)))' cannot rationally be conceived 
as expressing a true statement (expresses a false 
statement in all possible worlds) (expresses a self-
contradictory statement) 1 
or that it cannot rationally be conceived that some indi-
vidual with the capacity for pain lacks the capacity to 
want, that is, 
(B) ' ~ ( (~) (~ has the capacity for pain :::i (3::l_ (x has ~ ' 
& y is the capacity to want)))' cannot rationally 
be conceived as expressing a true statement (ex-
presses a false statement in all possible worlds) 
expresses a self-contradictory statement). 
Whether the analytic interpretation, as I have set forth, 
adequately expresses the views of Aristotle and Descartes 
in the passages just quoted is not clear. I am inclined 
to think that it is a correct expression, especially version 
(B), of Descartes' views. The case of Aristotle is much 
1These alternatives all stand in need of clarification, 
and it is not obvious that once given they will be found to 
be equivalent. Nevertheless, they will suffice to mark off 
the two sub-classes of definitional connections I have in 
mind. 
more difficult. There is room for the development of his 
remarks along the lines either of the analytic interpreta-
tion or the conceptual interpretation I discuss below. 
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The claim that there is a necessary connection between 
pain and wanting is, I believe, more plausible on the analy-
tic than on the causal interpretation. Even so, I do not 
think it can be upheld on either the (A) or (B) versions of 
the analytic interpretation. It succumbs in the end to 
Hume's dictum that whatever can be conceived distinctly can 
be conceived to exist separate from each other. Consider 
first version (A). This version can be distinguished into 
a stronger and weaker claim according as 'y''s range of appli-
cation is or is not meant to be restricted to objects and 
actions suitable (or, at least, thought suitable) to avoid-
ing the particular pain ~ has. Cases which fail to satisfy 
the stronger claim can easily be imagined. Some people pinch 
themselves to find out whether they are dreaming. In such 
cases, although people anticipate pain, they do not want 
to do anything to avoid it but on the contrary want to do 
something to bring it on. Again, masochism is a familiar 
psychological aberration. It is so common,. indeed, that 
to call it an aberration seems no longer appropriate. 
In such cases, although people have pain, they do not want 
to do anything to get rid of it but on the contrary want 
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to prolong it to the last delicious moment. It might be 
objected that the masochist could be correctly described as 
wanting to avoid the pain of having no pain. This seems to 
me to be nonsense. For it implies that if his desire is 
not fulfilled, then it is fulfilled. If he does not avoid 
the pain of having no pain, then he has pain and, hence, 
has avoided the pain of having no pain. These cases satisfy 
the weaker claim of version (A). There are others, however, 
which do not even satisfy this claim. A person sometimes 
has sympathetic pain when someone he loves is injured. If 
my young son has broken his leg, for example, I may feel 
pain in my knee even though I have no injury there. Now in 
such cases the person cannot always be correctly said to want 
to get rid of the pain. In my example, my sympathetic pain 
might have been occasioned by guilt feelings at having per-
mitted my son to engage in the activity in which he broke 
his leg and may help to assuage those feelings. Nor can it 
always be correctly said in such cases that what one wants 
is to feel sympathy for the injured person. Sometimes one 
wants to feel sympathy for an injured person-- especially 
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in cases where one thinks that one ought to feel sympathy 
for him but cannot. But normally one does not feel sympathy 
because one wants to, nor is one's sympathetic feeling the 
object of any want. It might be objected that one who has 
sympathetic pain must at least want to do whatever he can to 
alleviate the pain of the injured person. I think this is a 
powerful objection vis-a-vis cases like that of my young 
----- . 
son. But this case can be slightly altered so as to reduce 
the force of the objection. Sympathetic pain is not always 
occasioned by observing the sufferings of someone who is 
loved. It sometimes arises merely in the course of recount-
ing the details of these sufferings. Suppose now that my 
son had received mortal injuries and that I am recounting 
the details of his sufferings after his death. It certainly 
could happen that I would have sympathetic pain, but I 
would not want to do whatever I could to alleviate the pain 
of my dead son. But wouldn't I want at least to have alle-
viated it? This cannot correctly be said. As Aristotle 
points out, although wishing may relate to things that 
could in no way be brought about by one's own efforts, want-
ing cannot, and what is past could in no way be brought 
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about by one's own efforts. 1 But must not an individual 
who has pain at least want something, no matter how far-
fetched the connection is between what he wants and the pain 
he has? I do not think that even this need be granted. But, 
first, notice how far the defender of the claim that there 
is a necessary connection between pain and wanting has been 
pushed. He is no longer in the position of defending ver-
sion (A) of the analytic interpretation but version (B). So 
let us examine now version (B). Cases which fail to satisfy 
this version are also not very hard to find. Consider first 
the case of a dog. A dog can be correctly said to be yelp-
ing with pain when he is being beaten. But can he correctly 
be said to have the capacity to want? I believe so. When 
he is scratching violently round the edges and snuffling 
along the bottom of a door beyond which there lies a piece 
of meat, he can correctly be said to want the piece of meat. 
Consider, however, a fly, an ant, or a bee. Why do we think 
a child cruel who tears the wings off a fly or impales it 
on a pin to watch its futile struggles but are indifferent 
when he tears the petals off a flower? Is it not because 
we think that he is . .taking delight in the suffering of his 
1see Nie. Eth. Bk. ii, chs. 2 and 3 and Bk. vi, ch. 2. 
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victim? Suppose we learn afterwards that it is merely a 
mechanical toy made to look very much like a fly. 1 It seems 
clear that a fly can be correctly said to have the capacity 
f . 2 or pain. But now consider a fly buzzing around an uncover-
ed dish of honey. We quite naturally say that the fly is 
drawn or attracted to the honey, but would feel uncomforta-
ble in saying that it wants the honey, unless we understood 
this as a metaphorical way of saying just that it is drawn 
or attracted to the honey. 3 Contrast this case with that 
of the dog which is scratching violently around the edges 
and snuffling along the bottom of the door. To say that he 
is drawn or attracted to the meat seems to be only a meta-
phorical way of saying that he wants it. It makes sense 
to speak of wanting something only where it also makes sense 
to distinguish wanting it from merely being drawn or at-
tracted to it, which does not imply, of course, that someone 
1
we do not normally chastise a child who breaks the 
arms off his toy soldiers. In fact, we expect it. 
2Notice how we hasten to assure each other that the 
shrill sound we hear when boiling a live lobster is just 
the air escaping from beneath its shell. 
3consider: A man can be drawn or attracted to someone 
with whom he does not want to have anything to do. But can 
a fly be drawn or attracted to something it does not want? 
Is this merely because a fly always wants what it is drawn 
or attracted to? Oh, happy creature! 
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cannot want what he is drawn or attracted to. But in the 
case of a fly such a distinction makes no sense. It makes 
no sense in the sense that there are no criteria whose satis-
faction would establish that a fly is drawn or attracted to 
what he does not want. But then a fly cannot be correctly 
said to have the capacity to want, although it can be cor-
rectly said to have a capacity for pain. 
Do these difficulties with the causal and analytic 
interpretations show that Aristotle and Descartes were wrong 
to claim a necessary connection between pain and wanting? 
I think that most of us feel there is something right in what 
they were saying. I would like now to try to disclose the 
source of our refusal to reject their claim even when faced 
with such obvious counterexamples to its two most natural 
interpretations. The concept of pain is such that we would 
not have that concept unless we also had the concept of want-
ing. I am guided here by Wittgenstein's remarks: 
••• if things were quite different from what they 
actually are--if there were for instance no characteris-
tic expression of pain, of fear, or joy; if rule became 
exception and exception rule; or if both became phenom-
ena of roughly equal frequency--this would make our 
normal language-games lose their point • • • • What we 
have to mention in order to explain the significance, 
I mean the importance, of a concept, are often ex-
tremely general facts of nature: such facts as are 
hardly1ever mentioned because of their great gener-ality. 
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One fact of nature, which is clearly of the kind Wittgenstein 
had in mind, is that most human beings who have pain gener-
ally want to get rid of it and that most human beings who 
anticipate pain generally want to avoid it. Wanting to get 
rid of pain and wanting to avoid it are characteristic ex-
periences of pain which partly explain our having the con-
cept of pain. This fact, of course, does not fully explain 
our having the concept of pain. A more complete explana-
tion would have to mention such facts which show that it is 
natural for most human beings generally to react to the pain-
behavior of other human beings by pitying and treating the 
part that hurts, facts to which Wittgenstein calls attention 
when he remarks: 
Imagine not merely the words 'I am in pain' but also 
the answer 'It's not so bad' replaced by instinctive 
noises and gestures.2 
If it were not natural for most human beings generally to 
react this way, if, for example, our natural attitude toward 
someone exhibiting pain-behavior were the same as our 
1QE_. cit., sec. 142 and note. 
2
rbid., sec. 310. 
Zettel, trans. G. E. M. 
1967) ,. secs. 540-41 and 
Cf. also ibid., pp.· 179-80 and 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
545. 
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attitude toward a machine one of whose parts had just 
broken off, there would be no point to our language-game 
with the word "pain." But this fact and the language-game 
which it partly explains do not rule out the possibility 
that some human beings generally do not pity or try to com-
fort and heal other human beings who exhibit pain-behavior 
or even that most human beings sometimes do not react this 
way. Similarly, that it is natural for most human beings 
generally to want to get rid of and avoid pain and the lan-
guage-game which this fact partly explains do not rule out 
the possibility that some human beings generally do not 
want to get rid of or avoid pain or that most human beings 
sometimes do not want to get rid of or avoid pain or even 
that some individuals1 which have the capacity for pain and 
which are in pain lack the capacity to want anything at all. 
1The application of the concept of pain to flies, ants, 
and bees is based on resemblances between their behavior 
and the behavior of human beings in similar circumstances. 
Cf. Wittgenstein's remarks 11 ••• only of a living human 
being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being 
can one say: it has sensations ••• " (Philosophical 
Investigations, sec. 281). "Look at a stone and imagine 
it having sensations .·--one says to oneself: How could one 
so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? 
One might as well ascribe it to a number!--And now look at a 
wriggling fly and at once these difficultie~ vanish and pain 
seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything 
was, so to speak, too smooth for it" (ibid., sec. 284). 
c 
81 
But if this were not a fact of nature, then, again, there 
would be no point to our language-game with the word "pain." 
I shall call this interpretation of the necessary connection 
claimed to hold between pain and wanting the "conceptual 
interpretation." 
I wish to make it clear, if it is not already clear, 
that the foregoing is not an argument. It is an attempt to 
explain the source of our refusal to reject the claim that 
there is a necessary connection between pain and wanting 
even when faced with obvious counterexamples to two of its 
most natural interpretations and to propose a third inter-
pretation of this claim which avoids these counterexamples. 
Now, it may be objected that the explanation given is really 
no explanation at all, since it presupposes a distinction 
between what is essential to a language-game and what is 
not, and this distinction is just what needs to be explained. 
The necessary connection between pain and wanting, on the 
present view, is to be explained in terms of the role want-
ing plays in the language-game of pain. But how do we know 
that this role is an essential one? Wittgenstein puts the 
objection as follows: 
But how can I decide what is an essential, and what 
an inessential, accidental, feature of the notation? 
Is there some reality lying behind the notation, 
which shapes its grarnmar?l 
Wittgenstein makes no explicit reply to this objection, 
but it is clear from many of the things that he says2 what 
his reply would be. It is one that I accept. To decide 
what is an essential, and what an inessential, accidental, 
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feature of a language-game, describe the language-game. As-
semble cases which throw light on the importance of a given 
feature to the language-game in question. In particular, 
to decide whether wanting plays an essential or inessential 
role in the language-game of pain, describe the language-
game of pain. In Chapter II, I assembled cases which, I 
believe, show the importance of wanting to the language-
game of pain. Declining an invitation, making an appointment 
to see the dentist, hiring someone to do the heavy work 
involved in running one's business, a person's selling his 
business and marrying someone who he knows can be depended 
on to take care of him all constitute behavior expressive 
of both wanting and pain. But, clearly, it does not follow 
1Philosophical Investigations, sec. 562. 
2see ibid., especially secs. 89-133. 
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from the fact that such behavior is expressive of both want-
ing and pain that wanting is an essential feature of the lan-
guage-game with the word "pain." Such behavior is expres-
sive of many other things besides, some of which it would 
be most implausible to claim were essential to the language-
game. Even granting that such cases exist and are indeed 
common, can there not be disagreement in their interpreta-
tion? And, further, cannot other cases be cited of behavior 
expressive of pain but not of wanting? Of course. That 
there is disagreement regarding what is essential to a 
language-game, however, only shows that further description, 
the assembling of additional cases, is required. But why 
should it be thought that there must ~ be agreement in 
the interpretation of cases, that there must ~be agree-
ment as to what is essential and what is not? If there can-
not be a private language, if language is essentially inter-
personal, as Wittgenstein claims and tries to show, then 
there must be such agreement. 
If language is to be a means of communication there 
must be agreement not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgments.! 
1Ibid., sec. 242. 
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This is because "the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life. 111 Agreement in judgments 
"is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. 112 I 
accept this view. 
Now the concept of a brain process is not tied up with 
the concept of wanting in the same way that the concept of 
pain is. It is not essential to the language-game in which 
' the word "brain process" has its original home that human 
beings want to put an end to or avoid the occurrence of cer-
tain kinds of brain processes or even that human beings 
want anything at all. The concept of a brain process in 
fact belongs to an entirely different region of language 
than does the concept of wanting--to the order, one might 
say, of causes rather than to the order of reasons. One 
of the virtues of the conceptual interpretation of the neces-
sary connection claimed to hold between pain and wanting is 
that it focuses'attention on just this point. What makes 
it easy to confuse the two orders of explanation, I believe, 
is, first, the fact that they are both orders of explana-
tion and, second, the failure carefully to distinguish 
1~., sec. 23. 2Ibid,, sec. 241. 
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between the quite different notions of explaining why an 
event occurred and substantiating its occurrence, that is, 
describing evidence on the basis of which it would be ra-
tional to assert that the event did occur. That the word 
"explanation" is used in both orders does not bring them 
any closer together than does the fact that the word "predic-
tion" is also used in both orders. Compare in this regard 
Wittgenstein's remark: 
Examine these two language-games: 
(a) Someone gives someone else the order to make 
particular movements with his arm, or to assume partic-
ular bodily positions (gymnastics instructor and pupil). 
And here is a variation of this language-game: the 
pupil gives himself orders and then carries them out. 
(b) Someone observes certain regular processes--
for example, the reactions of different metals to acids--
and thereupon makes predictions about the reactions that 
will occur in certain particular cases. 
There is an evident kinship between these two lan-
guage-games, and also a fundamental difference. In 
both one might call the spoken words 'predictions.' 
But compare the training which leads to the first tech-
nique with the training for the second one.l 
And although the occurrence of a certain kind of brain proc-
ess could become evidence for the occurrence of a certain 
kind of wanting (on the ground of observed correlations 
between the occurrence of brain processes of that kind and 
behavioral criteria for the occurrence of wantings of that 
1rbid_. , sec. 630. 
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kind) , statements describing the occurrence of the former 
could not, together with general laws, explain why a want-
ing of any kind occurred. The reason one might be tempted 
to believe that they can, even apart from the failure to 
distinguish explanation from substantiation, is that state-
ments describing the occurrence of a certain kind of brain 
process could, together with general laws, explain the oc-
currence of events which count as evidence for the occur-
rence of a certain kind of wanting. Thus, such statements 
could explain the occurrence of other kinds of brain proc-
esses correlated with behavioral criteria for the occurrence 
of that kind of wanting or even explain the occurrence of 
the bodily movements which such behavioral criteria involve. 
There are many features of the concept of wanting in 
virtue of which it falls outside the order of explanation 
to which the concept of a brain process belongs. In the 
passage just quoted, Wittgenstein asks us to compare the 
11 training11 which leads to the employment of a concept in 
the order of causes with the training which leads to the 
employment of a concept in the order of reasons. It is 
easy to see that the training which leads to the employment 
of the concept of wanting is very different from the training 
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which leads to the employment of the concept of a brain proc-
ess. Again, in the passage immediately succeeding this one, 
Wittgenstein contrasts the "antecedents" of--that is, the 
"thoughts, actions and so on" which lead up to--propositions 
employing concepts such as that of wanting with the antece-
dents of propositions employing concepts such as that of a 
brain process. And in earlier passages, he speaks of the 
"surroundings" essential to the'employment of a concept. 1 
It is easy to see that the surroundings essential to the 
employment of the concept of wanting are very different 
from those essential to the employment of the concept of a 
brain process. The concept of wanting requires institu-
tions, customs, practices. Thus, a person cannot want to be 
king or want a lot of money unless there exist governmental 
institutions or financial institutions. But such institu-
tions are not required for the employment of the concept 
of a brain process. A further feature of the concept of 
wanting, which Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss 
but which has lately received considerable attention, is that 
a particular occurrence of wanting can be identified only by 
1see ibid., secs. 583-84. 
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reference to an object in an intentional description, that 
is to say, in that description of the object wanted under 
which it is wanted by the individual in question. Not every 
true description of an object is one under which an individ-
ual wants it; only under certain of its descriptions will it 
be wanted. This feature is also one in virtue of which the 
concept of wanting falls outside the order of explanation to 
which the concept of a brain process belongs. Only events 
which do not essentially fall under an intentional descrip-
tion or whose identification does not essentially involve 
reference to an object in an intentional description are 
appropriate explananda for this order of explanation. 
The concept of pain does not entirely fall outside the 
order of explanation to which the concept of a brain proc-
ess belongs. It, as it were, straddles both the order of 
causes and the order of reasons. While it is possible to 
explain the occurrence of a pain by reference to the occur-
rence of a certain kind of brain process, it is also possi-
ble to explain the occurrence of a certain kind of wanting 
by reference to the occurrence of a pain. That the concept 
of pain has also a role to play in the orde:ir of explanation 
to which the concept of wanting belong-s is a consequence of 
.·;\ 
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the conceptual interpretation of the necessary connection 
claimed to hold between pain and wanting. Indeed it is 
only on the conceptual interpretation, I believe, that this 
fact about pain becomes fully intelligible. The middle posi-
tion of pain with respect to the two orders of explanation 
seems to have been recognized by Descartes, for he makes 
pain as well as all the other sensations "certain confused 
' 
modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent 
intermingling of mind and body. 111 Now it may be said that 
if it is possible to explain the occurrence of a pain by 
reference to the occurrence of a certain kind of brain proc-
ess and possible to explain the occurrence of a certain kind 
of wanting by reference to the occurrence of a pain, then it 
should be possible to explain the occurrence of a certain 
kind of wanting by reference to the occurrence of a pain. 
And this would mean that the concept of wanting does not 
after all fall outside the order of explanation to which the 
concept of a brain process belongs. But this objection 
assumes that explanation must he transitive, and such is 
1Meditations, VI (HR, I, 192). Descartes classifies 
desire as an "action ofthe soul" and says that all our de-
sires "proceed directly from our soul, and appear to depend 
on it alone" (The Passions of the Soul, I, 17 (HR, I, 340)). 
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clearly not the case. It is easy to think of cases which 
show that explanation is not transitive. Thus, for example, 
"A killed B's father" could be an explanation of why B 
killed A but not why C (who is A's son) then killed B. 
The view that pain is necessarily connected with wanting 
is on the conceptual interpretation of this necessary connec-
tion unaffected by obvious counterexamples to two of its most 
natural interpretations. This view, I have shown, was held 
both by Aristotle and Descartes and is in agreement, I be-
lieve, with the sorts of things we would be naturally in-
clined to say about the connection between pain and wanting. 
But a consequence of the conceptual interpretation is that 
the concept of wanting falls outside the order of explanation 
to which the concept of a brain process belongs and that the 
concept of pain has a role to play in the order of explana-
tion to which the concept of wanting belongs. These consid-
erations cast serious doubt, I believe, on the claim that it 
would be reasonable in the light of future scientific ad-
vances of the appropriate sort to revise our conceptual 
scheme in such a way that the role played by sensation-
statemen ts in our lives could be taken over by neurophysio-
logical statements. We are not yet in a position fully to 
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assess this claim, however. For a natural reply to this line 
of argument would be to grant that the concept of wanting 
falls outside the order of explanation to which the concept 
of a brain process belongs but then to go on to claim that 
future scientific advances could make it reasonable to re-
describe the relevant phenomena in such a way as to eliminate 
the concept of wanting in favor of a concept which does not 
fall outside the order of explanation-to which the concept 
of a brain process belongs--in favo~ say, of a complex 
concept of bodily-movements-~-brain-processes. I do not 
think, however, that this second claim is anymore plausible 
than the first, and for precisely analogous reasons. For 
intending is necessarily connected with wanting in the same 
sense of "necessary connection" in which pain is necessarily 
connected with wanting. This should not be surprising, since, 
as P. F. Strawson observes, the concepts which clearly imply 
intention "are inextricably bound up with," "interwoven 
with" the other concepts which imply the possession of 
consciousness on the part of that to which they are applied. 
"The topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected 
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subjects. 111 I believe it is this notion of the unity of 
mind which also lies behind the following passage from 
Aristotle: 
• • • particulars subsumed under [living beings] con-
stitute a series, each successive term of which poten-
tially contains its predecessor, e.g •••• the sensory 
power the nutritive • • • • [C]ertain living beings--a 
small minority--possess calculation and thought, for 
(among mortal beings) those which possess calculation 
have all the other powers above mentioned [viz. the 
nutritive, appetitive, sensory, and locomotive powers]. 2 
Now if intending is necessarily connected with wanting ac-
cording to the conceptual interpretation, the elimination 
of the concept of wanting will involve also the elimination 
of the concept of intending. But the existence of this lat-
ter concept is surely essential to the existence of the con-
cept of a person. To use the terminology of Descartes to ex-
press a view with which, perhaps, he might have disagreed: 
Intending is the essential attribute of persons. 3 If the 
elimination of the concept of a person were a consequence 
of the elimination of the concept of wanting, we would be 
entitled, I think, to conclude that future scientific 
1Individuals (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 
1963), p. 109. 
2De An. 414b 29-415a 10. Aristotle held that the power 
to feeY-pain is necessarily connected with,if not included 
under, the sensory power. See De An. 413b 22-23. 
3I do not in fact think that Descartes would have dis-
agreed with this view. I rely here on Jaako Hintikka's 
profound interpretation of Descartes' cogi·to argument in his 
article "Cogito; Erao Sum: Inference or Performance?," 
Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 1, Jan. 1962, pp. 3-32. 
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advances could not make it reasonable to redescribe the 
relevant phenomena in such a way as to eliminate the con-
cept of wanting in favor of a concept which does not fall 
outside the order of explanation to which the concept of a 
1 brain process belongs. That intending is necessarily con-
nected with wanting is a view which, as the last passage 
quoted indicates, Aristotle held and is in agreement, I be-
lieve, with the sorts of things we would be naturally in-
clined to say about the connection between them. Just as 
in the case of pain and wanting, however, there are obvious 
counterexamples to two of the most natural interpretations 
of this necessary connection. Such counterexamples are 
otiose vis-a-vis the conceptual interpretation of this neces-
sary connection. In what follows I offer arguments in sup-
port of these claims. My arguments will be briefer than 
the ones offered in support of the parallel claims regarding 
pain and wanting, since the arguments for both sets of claims 
are precisely analogous. 
In the case of intending and wanting, as with pain and 
1The concept of a person, I hold, is an essential 
feature of our conceptual scheme. The possibility of 
eliminating this concept is enc which I consider later on 
in this chapter. 
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wanting, Aristotle wavers between a causal and a defini-
tional interpretation of "necessary connection." The clear-
est statements of these interpretations occur respectively 
in the following two passages: 
The origin of action--its efficient, not its final 
cause--is choice, and that of choice is desire and rea-
soning with a view to an end.l 
The object of choice being one of the things in our 
own power which is desired after deliberation, choice 
will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; 
for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, 
we desire in accordance with our deliberation,2 
These two passages together provide an account of how some-
one comes to perform an action. To put is schematically, A 
wants something X, deliberates on the means of obtaining X, 
decides on Y, and then rationally wants (chooses, intends) 
to do Y, which results--if nothing external prevents it--
in his doing Y. On this account, wanting is both causally 
and definitionally connected with intending. A's wanting 
X is a causally necessary condition (in the sense of effi-
cient causality) of his intending to do something Y which 
he regards as a means of obtaining X, and A's intending to 
1Nic. Eth. 1139a 31-32. Aristotle uses the concept of 
"choicen-where we would use that of "intent.ion." 
2N. J.C. Eth. 1113a 10-12. 
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do Y just consists in his rationally wanting to do Y. The 
objections raised earlier to the view that there is a neces-
sary connection between pain and wanting, where "necessary 
connection" is interpreted either causally or definitionally 
(in the analytic sense}, have their counterparts here. 
First, the mechanism Aristotle sets up between A's wanting 
something X and A's doing Y with the intention of obtaining 
X does not seem to fit many ordinary cases of acting with 
intention. Suppose that while in the supermarket I pass 
the dairy counter and, suddenly remembering that I am out of 
eggs, reach out, take the top carton off the third stack of 
cartons, and put it in my shopping-cart. Now it is certain-
ly true that I wanted eggs and performed this particular 
action with the intention of obtaining them. But I did not 
deliberate on the various possible ways of obtaining them, 
decide on reaching out, taking the top carton off the third 
stack of cartons, and putting it in my shopping-cart, and 
then intend to do just that, whereupon I did it. In this 
case, although the intermediate steps seem to be lacking, 
wanting and acting with intention are both present. It 
might be said, therefore, that the case does not provide a 
counterexample to the view that wanting is a causally 
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necessary condition of intending. Now there are some cases 
in which it is plausible to claim that wanting is a cause of 
intentional action. Suppose someone were to ask me why I am 
going to the supermarket, and I answer that I am out of eggs. 
It could be argued that I am giving a causal explanation of 
my action in terms of my wants. If I do not want any eggs, 
the fact that I am out of them will not explain why I am go-
ing to the supermarket. But whatever analysis of causation 
one accepts, a causal explanation must at least make what 
is explained more intelligible than it was before. This 
condition, however, would not be satisfied by a putative 
causal explanation in terms of my wants of the action in my 
original case. If someone were to ask me why I took the top 
carton of eggs off the third stack of cartons and put it in 
my shopping-cart, the answer "I wanted some eggs" would not 
make my action any more intelligible than it was before. 
Wanting-statements can serve as causal explanations only in 
certain circumstances. 
Secondly, cases can easily be found or invented which 
fail to satisfy the formla "A's intending to do Y just 
consists in his rationally wanting to do Y.. Interestingly, 
there arc hints of such cases in the very same discussion 
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in which Aristotle presents his definition of "choice." 
Consider the following remarks: 
[M]en make themselves responsible for being ••• self-
indulgent • • • by spending their time in drinking 
bouts and the like: for it is activities exercised on 
particular objects that make the corresponding charac-
ter • • • • [I]t is irrational to suppose that a man 
who acts • • • self-indulgently [does not wish] to be 
self-indulgent. • • • [T] o the self-indulgent man, it 
was open at the beginning not to become [a man] of this1 kind, and so [he is] self-indulgent voluntarily •••• 
These remarks suggest the following counterexample to the 
above formula. A intends to stay away from Jimmy's tonight 
even though he does not want to stay away, because he knows 
that unless he can bring himself to stop now he will end up 
like his father. Now if A does not want to stay away, then 
a fortiori he does not rationally want to stay away. So A 
intends to do something he does not rationally want to do. 
It might be replied that wants run counter to one another, 
as is well known, so that it is possible to describe this 
case as one in which A both wants and does not want to stay 
away. The issue, however, is not whether it is possible 
to describe this case in such a way but whether it is possi-
ble to describe it as one in which A has no desire whatever 
to stay away. To argue that although A does not want to 
1Nic. Eth. 1114a 5-21. 
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stay away, A·~ ·rationally want to stay away because clear-
ly A wants a temperate character and A regards staying away 
a necessary means of obtaining one would be futile. For 
by parity of reasoning one could argue that A must rationally 
want not to stay away because ~ wants to get drunk and re-
gards not staying away a means of obtaining this condition. 
So that A rationally wants both to stay away and not to stay 
away. And since rationally wanting something ~' according 
to the formula, is intending to do X, it would follow that 
A intends both to stay away and not to stay away, which is 
absurd. Now this case would satisfy a weaker version of the 
formula which, nevertheless, still implied an analytic con-
nection between intending and wanting: If A intends to do 
something X, then either A must want to do X or else A must 
want Y and regard X as a means of obtaining !· The case 
just presented does satisfy the second disjunct of the 
apodosis. There are cases which can be constructed, however, 
which fail to satisfy even this version. For persons can--
and, indeed, often do--intend to do things which they do 
not regard as a means of obtaining what they want but as a 
means of obtaining what someone else wants. It might be 
replied that such cases are ones in which the persons do 
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want something after all which what they intend to do will 
be a means of obtaining, namely, they want that the other 
person's wants be satisfied. But this is certainly not al-
ways true. I may intend to do something I do not want to do 
for someone whom I hate--someone whose wants I do not want 
to be satisfied. I intend to do it out of fear. But then 
do I not intend to do it because I want, at least, to pre-
serve myself? Not necessarily. The person whom I fear may 
have died long ago, as I am well aware, but his influence on 
me while living might have been such that I cannot now bring 
myself to act contrary to what I think he would have wanted. 
But must I not at least want something? This brings us to 
the weakest version of the claim that there is a necessary 
connection between intending and wanting, on the analytic 
interpretation of "necessary condition": If A is able to 
act with intention, then A must have the capacity to want. 
The status of this claim is a profoundly difficult issue. 
It cannot be decided by bringing forward cases but turns 
on the question of whether the concept of a necessarily 
perfect being--hence, one that necessarily wants nothing--
which nevertheless acts freely is internally consistent. 
The intelligibility of such a concept is not obvious, but 
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neither is its unintelligibility obvious. 
I do not think, however, that the issue of whether in-
tending is necessarily connected with wanting is as pro-
foundly difficult as this one nor that it must wait for its 
solution upon the solution of the latter. If the necessary 
connection claimed to hold between intending and wanting is 
given a conceptual interpretation, then, I think, the issue 
can be resolved in favor of the claim. The concept of in-
tending is such that we would not have that concept unless 
we also had the concept of wanting. That most human beings 
. generally want to do what they intend to do and that most 
human beings generally want to perform the intentional ac-
tions they in fact perform are both contingent facts. But 
unless there were such general facts we would have no use 
for the concept of intending. It would have no role to play 
in our lives. If we were to come upon a tribe of super-
ascetics who were in all other respects like human beings 
except that they never wanted to do what they in fact did, 
what right would we have to say that they had any wants at 
all? The distinction between wanting and wishing would seem 
to lose its purpose in such circumstances, and so we would 
probably hesitate to use the concept of wanting. But then 
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would we still be willing to use the concept of intending? 
The phenomena, as Wittgenstein remarks in another connec-
. 1 . . tion, would gravitate towards another paradigm. Paradoxi-
cally, we would probably come to view the actions of these 
super-ascetics in the way we view the movements of leaves 
blown about by the wind. I am not saying that the concept 
of a super-ascetic is unintelligible. Once we have the 
concept of intending we can extend it to individuals who 
never want to do what they do and thus also come to have the 
concept of a super-ascetic. We may even be able to extend 
it to a being which has no wants whatever. But a necessary 
condition of doing this is that it have some role to play in 
our lives, and it would have no role to play unless most of 
us generally wanted to do the things we did. 
We are now in a better position to assess the claim 
that it would be reasonable in the l:ight of future scientific 
advances of the appropriate sort to revise our conceptual 
scheme in such a way that the role played by sensation-
statements in our lives could be taken over by neurophysio-
logical statements. Earlier I argued that the most satis-
factory account of the connection between pain and wanting 
, 
... Op. cit., sec. 385. 
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can be given on what I have called the "conceptual interpre-
tation." A consequence of the conceptual interpretation, 
however,·· is that while sensation-statements do in fact ex-
plain the occurrence of certain kinds of wanting, neuro-
physiological statements could not explain why a 1wanting of 
any kind occurred. To avoid the conclusion that sensation-
statements play an important role in our lives which could not 
be taken over by neurophysiological statements, it seemed 
possible to argue that future scientific advances could make 
it reasonable to redescribe the relevant phenomena in such a 
way as to eliminate the concept of wanting in favor of a con-
cept of a type of event whose occurrences could be explained 
by neurophysiological statements. The conceptual interpreta-
tion, however, also provides the most satisfactory account 
of the connection between intending and wanting, and a conse-
quence of this interpretation is that the elimination of the 
concept of wanting would involve the elimination of the con-
cept of intending. And since intending is, if not the, at 
least an essential feature of the concept of a person, 
the elimination of the concept of the former would result 
in the elimination of the latter. In view of this result, 
I think that we would be justified in rejecting the claim 
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that it would be reasonable to revise our conceptual scheme 
in the way suggested. I do not propose to argue here that 
intending is an essential feature of the concept of a per-
son, although I believe that compelling arguments can be giv-
en. What would have to be shown is that in the same way in 
which the concepts of pain, wanting, and intending are con-
nected the concept of intending is connected with the vast 
majority of concepts of the states of consciousness which 
would be regarded--if not severally, then at least some 
group or another of them--as essential features of the con-
cept of a person. Such arguments would be lengthy but would 
not involve anything essentially different from the arguments 
I have presented in my discussion of pain, wanting, and in-
tending. Should it be thought possible to analyze the con-
cept of a person into purely "theoretical" concepts, my re-
ply is that mental concepts do not fall into two mutually 
exclusive classes called "theoretical" and "practical." 
This is a fact which has often been pointed out. Wittgen-
stein 1 s notions of a "language-game" and "form of life" are 
both expressions of and meant to give expression to this 
fact. And the centrality of the concept of .intention among 
mental concepts applicable to persons has received recognition 
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in a growing literature already too extensive to cite. 
I want to consider one final suggestion for avoiding 
the conclusion that sensation-statements play an important 
role in our lives which could not be taken over by neurophy-
siological statements. It may be suggested that future scien-
tific advances could make it reasonable to redescribe the 
relevant phenomena in such a way as to eliminate the concept 
of a person with its essential feature of intention in favor 
of a concept of a type of entity lacking features not amena-
ble to neurophysiological explanation. I think, however, that 
an argument can be constructed on the basis of the centrality 
of the concept of intention among concepts applicable to per-
sons which shows that this suggestion is logically absurd. 1 
First, describing (and hence redescribing) , whether "public" 
or "private," is an intentional act. Generally, all of think-
ing except the mere entertaining of a proposition and the 
free constructions of the imagination in reverie and dream-
ing (I rule out the thinking of an intuitive understanding 
such as God is often said to have) involves judging, and 
1 I am indebted to Norman Malcolm's article, "The Con-
ceivability of Mechanism" (Philosophical ·Review, LXXVII 
(1968), 45-72, especially pp. 67-71) for the idea of such 
an argument. 
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this in turn, since judging is either affirming or denying, 
is an intentional act. If the concept of intention did not 
exist, accordingly, no marks or sounds would count as "de-
scriptions." Second, having rational grounds for saying or 
doing anything implies that the saying or doing is intention-
al. Without the concept of intention, accordingly, nothing 
would count as "rational grounds" for anything. The logical 
absurdity of the suggestion under discussion, then, is that 
the elimination of the concept of a person with its essen-
tial feature of intention is inconsistent with, first, the 
existence of redescriptions in virtue of which it has been 
eliminated and, second, the existence of scientific advances 
which make reasonable such redescriptions. 
CHAPTER IV 
INCORRIGIBILITY AND MIND-BODY IDENTITY 
In the controversy between partisans of the Mind-Body 
Identity Theory and their opponents, logical similarities 
and differences be.tween explanation-types have received lit-
tle attention. My discussion so far has focused on logical 
differences between sensation-explanation and physiological 
explanation which must be taken account of in deciding this 
controversy. I want to consider now an issue which has re-
ceived considerable attention of late, the so-called issue 
of "incorrigibility." Opponents of the Mind-Body Identity 
Theory claim that incorrigibility (in the sense defined be-
low) is an important feature of sensation-statements which 
could not be a feature of physiological statements. Identity 
Theorists have replied either by challenging the significance 
of incorrigibility in the sense in which it cannot be a 
feature of physiological statements or by trying to show 
that it would be reasonable in the light of future scientif~ 
ic advances to eliminate in principle this feature. I do 
not propose in this chapter to take up the question of 
whether the incorrigibility of sensation-statements can be 
eliminated. This question will occupy the whole of Chapter 
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V. What I will try to show there is that the same logical 
differences between explanation-types which make doubtful 
the possibility of eliminating sensation-statements also 
make doubtful the possibility of eliminating incorrigibility 
as a feature of these statements. The discussion of the pres-
ent chapter will focus on the significance of incorrigibility 
for the Mind-Body Identity Theory. 
The issue of incorrigibility has recently focused on 
attempts to distinguish various possible senses in which 
persons might be said to be in a specially favorable epis-
temic position vis-a-vis their own current mental states. 1 
The senses which are of most concern to the present discus-
sion have been conveniently summarized by Norman Malcolm 
in a recent essay. 
I think the facts that give rise to the illusion of 
privacy would be the following: (a) you can be in 
doubt as to whether I am in pain, but I cannot; · (b) 
you can find out whether I am in pain, but I cannot; 
and (c) you can be mistaken as to whether I am in 
pain,-but I cannot.2 
1The most notable of such attempts are William Alston's 
"Varieties 
Quarterl:t, 
"Privacy," 
(New York: 
of Privileged Access," American Philosophical 
vol. 8 (1971), pp. 223-241, and A. J. Ayer's 
in his The Concept of ~ Person and Other Essays 
St. Martin's Press, 1963). 
211 The Privacy of Experience," in A. Stroll, ed., Epis-
temolo_g~, r;re~ ~~~?ays in the Theory of Knowledge (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967), p. 146. 
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I shall hereafter refer to the conjunction of propositions 
which results from generalizing these three claims to cover 
all phenomenal states (as opposed to dispositional states, 
such as beliefs, desires, and attitudes) as the "thesis of 
incorrigibility." Descartes was the first philosopher, I 
believe, to have realized the metaphysical significance of 
the thesis of incorrigibility. He saw it as providing the 
criterion by which to distinguish mind from matter. 1 With 
the steadily increasing sophistication of materialist theo-
ries of the mind since Descartes, there has been a correspond-
ing increase in the sophistication of the metaphysical employ-
ment of this thesis. The thesis of incorrigibility has been 
strengthened and refined in various ways until it has <level-
oped into a powerful objection to such theories. Among the 
most vigorous recent proponents of this thesis is Wittgen-
stein and many of the philosophers who claim to have been 
influenced by him. All three components of the thesis are 
expressed in the following well-known passages from the 
1
oescartes held that persons are in a specially favora-
ble epistemic position in the three senses stated above 
even vis-a-vis their own dispositional stat~s (see Medita-
tions-;--YI-and III (HR, I, 153 and 157)). Most philosophers 
today would not accept this view without considerable qual-
ification. 
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Philosophical Investigations: 
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations 
only from my behavior,--for I cannot be said to learn 
of them. I have them. The truth is: it makes sense 
to say about other people that they doubt whether I am 
in pain; but not to say it about myself.I 
My temptation to say that one might take a sensation 
for something other than what it is arises from this: 
if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game 
with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion 
of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility 
of error also exists.2 
G. E. M. Anscombe in Intention claims that pain belongs to a 
class of things about which a person has the right to speak 
without observation, which is not to say that they are 
known without observation. It makes no sense to speak here 
of knowledge at all, she holds, since there is no possibility 
3 of being wrong. John Cook, in an important article on the 
"private language argument," argues that it makes sense to 
speak of a person's finding out that he is in pain only if 
it makes sense to speak of a person as not being "in as 
good a position as one could want" for correctly answering 
a certain question or making a certain statement about his 
1Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953}, 
sec. 246. 
2Ibid., sec. 288. See also secs. 289, 408, and pp. 
221-22~ 
3{rthaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 13~14. 
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pain, and that this last does not make sense. 1 Again, he 
suggests that "where [someone] thinks we can (or do) doubt 
or make mistakes about our sensations, he has merely oddly 
described something else. 112 Two components of the thesis 
of incorrigibility are expressed in the following passage 
from Sydney Shoemaker's book, Self-Knowledge and Self-
Identity: 
[First-person present-tense phenomenal statements] are 
incorrigible in the sense that if a person sincerely 
asserts such a statement it does not make sense to sup-
pose, and nothing could be accepted as showing, that he 
is mistaken, i.e., that what he says is false •••• 
[I]t is characteristic of [first-person present-tense 
phenomenal statements] that being entitled to assert 
such a statement does not consist in having established 
that the statement is true, i.e., in having good evi-
dence that it is true or having observed that it is 
true, 3but consists simply in the statement's being true. 
And Shoemaker makes it clear that he thinks the third com-
ponent to follow from the conjunction of these two. It 
is because this conjunction is true that "the sentence 'I 
seem to be in pain' is, if not senseless, without a role 
111wittgenstein on Privacy," Philosophical Review, 
vol. 74 (1965), pp. 285-86. 
2rbid., p. 288. 
3 crthaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 216. 
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to play in our language. 111 Finally, Robert Coburn, in the 
course of defending Strawson's claim that it is essential to 
the character of phenomenal predicates 11 that they are both 
self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of observation 
of the behavior of the subject of them, and other-ascribable 
on the basis of behavior criteria, 112 details a number of "ab-
surdities 11 which he claims to follow from denying any one of 
the three components. 3 
The metaphysical employment of the thesis of incorrigi-
bility (METI) has naturally been subjected to heavy criticism 
by philosophers interested in defending one form or another 
of materialism. It has also been criticized by philosophers 
who have no special interest in defending materialism but who 
are merely dissatisfied with the arguments offered in its 
favor. On canvassing the recent literature, I think it is 
possible to discern six general lines of reply which this 
criticism has taken. These may conveniently be set out as 
1
rbid., p. 226, n. 
2rndividuals (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 104-105. 
311 Persons and Psychological Concepts, 11 American Philo-
sophical Quarterly, vol. 4 (1967), pp. 214-20. 
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follows: 
(R1) Incorrigibility is not a feature of our phenom-
enal concepts. 
(R2) Although incorrigibility is a feature of our 
phenomenal concepts, the empirical facts could 
have been such that our phenomenal concepts lack-
ed this feature. 
(R3) Although incorrigibility is a feature of our 
phenomenal concepts, the empirical facts could 
have been such that we lacked concepts with this 
feature. 
(R4) Although incorrigibility is a feature of phenomenal 
concepts, it does not follow that sincere first-
person present-tense reports of phenomenal states 
cannot justifiably be over-ridden. 
(R5 ) Although incorrigibility is a feature of our 
phenomenal concepts, additions to our stock of 
empirical knowledge together with advances in 
technology could lead to the elimination of this 
feature from our phenomenal concepts. 
(R6) Although incorrigibility is a fea~ure of our 
phenomenal concepts, additions to our stock of 
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empirical knowledge together with advances in 
technology could lead to the elimination of con-
cepts with this feature. 
The strategy behind (R1)-(R6) is to show not that the thesis 
of incorrigibility is false but that the only sense in which 
it may be true is one that is not damaging to any materialist 
theory of the mind. The force of (R1 ) is that the thesis 
of incorrigibility is plausible only as an empirical thesis 
and so cannot be used to show that there is some reason in 
logic preventing the reduction of phenomenal concepts to 
neurophysiological concepts. The force of (R2)-(R6) is that 
although it is not an empirical thesis, it does nothing to 
show that persons are in a specially favorable epistemic 
position vis-a-vis their own current phenomenal states, 
since some or all of its components are either bare tautolo-
gies or true in virtue of linguistic conventions modifiable 
in the light of future empirical inquiry. 
Common to (R5) and (R6) are the claims (1) that incorri-
gibility is a feature of our phenomenal concepts and (2) that 
additions to our stock of empirical knowledge together with 
advances in technology could lead to the elimination in 
principle of this feature. Each of these positions makes 
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yet a third claim, however, which the other does not. This 
difference is to be attributed to the way in which claim (1) 
is construed in (R5) and (R6) respectively. In (R5), as in 
(R2), incorrigibility is held to be a synthetic feature of 
phenomenal concepts, while in (R6), as in (R3), it is held 
to be a necessary feature of these concepts. Now to eliminate 
from a concept one of its synthetic features would leave 
that concept intact, although indeed it is doubtful whether 
a concept whose great majority of synthetic features had been 
eliminated would survive. To eliminate from a concept one 
of its necessary features, however, would be to eliminate 
that concept. It is a consequence of the way in which claim 
(1) is construed in (R5), accordingly, that the sort of em-
pirical results postulated by claim (2) need not lead to the 
elimination of our phenomenal concepts, while it is a conse-
quence of the way in which claim (1) is construed in (R6) 
that such results must lead to the elimination of these 
concepts. The sets of claims in which (R5) and (R6) 
respectively consist are completed by statements that give 
expression to these consequences. 1 
1
versions of (R1) can be found in the following writ-ings: J. J. c. Smart, Philosophy and Scienti·f·ic Realism 
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(New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 92-105; c. s. 
Chihara and J.A. Fodor, 11 0perationalism and Ordinary Lan-
guage: A Critique of Wittgenstein," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 281-295; P. E. Meehl, "The 
Compleat Autocerebroscopist: A thought-Experiment on 
Professor Feigl's Mind-Body Identity Thesis," in P. Feyera-
bend and G. Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method (Minneap-
olis, University of Minnesota.-P"ress, 1966);13. Aune, Knowl-
edge, Mind, and Nature (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 
31-38; D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1968). G. Sheridan-;-in "The 
Electroencephelogram Argument against Incorrigibility," 
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6 (1969), pp. 62-70, 
defends a version of (R1) in which the latter is restricted 
to the application of phenomenal concepts only in some cir-
cumstances but not in others; Sheridan suggests, however, 
that the thesis of incorrigibility is not even true when 
restricted to circumstances in which (Rl) does not hold, 
since ~5) holds in such circumstances. For a statement and 
defense of (R2), see A. J. Ayer, "Can There be a Private 
Language?," in The Concept of~ Person and Other Essays 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 36-Sl, esp. pp. 
49-50. In a later essay, "Privacy," in ibid., pp. 52-81, 
esp. pp. 68-73, Ayer defends essentially the same position, 
although he makes a half-hearted gesture in the direction 
of (R1). Ayer, of course, is not a materialist, but some 
materiali~ts have thought his method of argument sufficient 
to rebut certain arguments in favor of METI. See, for exam-
ple, the use to which his argument has been put by R. Rorty, 
"Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Inconununicability," 
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), pp. 192-
205, esp. pp. 201-02. (R3) is not anywhere explicitly de-
fended, although it is obviously a close relative of (R2). 
Interestingly, it is P. F. Strawson who in an early arti-
cle, his review of Philosophical Investigations, Mind, vol. 
63 (1954), pp. 70-99, esp. pp. 83-89, came closest to enun-
ciating (R3) (in conflict, I would argue, with other posi-
tions he later took about the mental) in criticism of what 
he claimed was Wittgenstein's attempt to draw a certain 
consequence about the logic of sensation-language from the 
thesis of incorrigibility. I suspect too that supporters 
of (R6) rely on a tacit reference to ~3) for some of the 
plausibility of their own position; it is a short (though 
illegitimate) step from "contingent on the empirical facts" 
to "contingent on the state of empirical inquiry." (R4) 
can be found in R. Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, 
and Categories," Review of Meta~hysics, vol. 19 (1965), pp. 
24-54, esp. 41-48. H. Morick, in 11 Is Ultimate Epistemic 
Authority a Distinguishing Characteristic of the Psychologi-
cal?," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), 
pp. 292-95, also subscribes to (R4) by way of showing the 
"merely tautological" character of the thesis of incorri-
. gibility, but distinguishes from the latter the (significant) 
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thesis of "ultimate epistemic authority" which, he claims, 
is consistent with the possibility of justifiably overriding 
any given avowal of sensation. The clearest statements and 
most vigorous defense of (R5) appear in H. Putnam's articles: 
"Minds and Machines," in Dimensions of Mind, ed. s. Hook 
(New York: New York University Pres$, 1960), pp. 148-79; 
"The Analytic and the Synthetic," Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, III, ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell--
(MinneapoliS: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 
358-97; "Brains and Behavior" in Analytical Philosophy, II, 
ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), pp. 1-19. 
G. Sheridan, as earlier indicated, is also a supporter of 
(R5). (R6) was first introduced into the literature by 
P. K. Feyerabend in "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," 
Review of Metaphysics, vol. 17 (1963), pp. 49-66. The gener-
al positron of which (R6) was a part was thereafter taken 
up and elaborated upon by Rorty•in "Mind-Body Identity, Pri-
vacy, and Categories" and applied by him to other features of 
phenomenal concepts but, oddly, not to the feature of in-
corrigibility. In that article, as earlier indicated, Rorty 
chose to rely on (R4) , apparently thinking that he had discov-
ered an apodictic disproof of the significance of the thesis 
of incorrigibility. In any case, Rorty seems to have aban-
doned (R4) in later articles and now seems to rely exclusive-
ly on (R6). See, for example, his article "Incorrigibility 
as the Mark of the Mental," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67 
(1970), pp. 399-424, pp. 416-18. 
W. Sellars is often classified with the adherents of 
(R6). See, for example, R. J. Bernstein, "The Challenge 
of Scientific Materialism," International Philosophical Quar-
terly, vol. 8 (1968), pp. 252-75. Rorty 1 s repeated acknowl-
edgement of debt to Sellars also carries the same suggestion. 
I think, however, that this is mistaken. Rorty acknowledges 
his debt to Sellars in a footnote to the following sentence: 
"There is an obvious sense of 'same' in which what used to 
be called 'a quantity of calorific fluid' is the ~thing 
as what is now called a certain mean kinetic energy of mole-
cules, but there is no reason to think that all features 
truly predicated of the one may be sensibly predicated of 
the other." ("Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," 
pp. 26-27). Rorty evidently understands Sellars here as 
holding a view from which it follows that what people now 
call "sensations" is in an obvious sense identical with 
what will be referred to by some future expression whose 
logic would permit or require the elimination of embarrassing 
features demanded by the logic of present senation-language. 
In view, however, of Sellar's insistence on the "relocation" 
of raw feel universals, the "categorial transformation, but 
not substantive reduction, of raw feel predicates," the 
"transposing" of the "logical space" of raw feels ("The 
Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem," Review of ~­
physics, vol. 18 (1965), pp. 44.7-49), a more likely inter-
pretation of his position would be that the features expressed 
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Defenders of METI often proceed in a way which leaves 
them particularly vulnerable to--indeed, almost invites--
criticism along the lines of (R2)-(R6). The three facts men-
tioned in the passage I have used to introduce the thesis of 
incorrigibility, for example, are said by Malcolm to be 
"features of the 'grammar' of the word ['pain'], or of the 
'language-game,' with the word. 111 Again, in his monograph 
Dreaming, Malcolm claims t:he incorrigibility of first-person 
dream reports to be "a matter of definition. 112 And in an 
earlier essay restricted to a discussion of after-images, 
he says that after-image reports are incorrigible in the 
sense that under certain conditions 
• • • there cannot be a question of his being in error 
when he says 'I see an after-image.' There cannot be 
by predicates true of what people now call "sensations" could 
be (that is to say, it makes sense to suppose that they are) 
identical with features which will be expressed by predicates 
of an as yet to be elaborated theory of brain activity. The 
sense of "identical" in question is the trivial sense in which 
the features expressed by predicates true of what people now 
call "sensations" are identical with currently unreduced psy-
chic features of persons. This interpretation is supported 
by Sellars' admission that he accepts only a non-controver-
sial and unexciting version of the identity theory according 
to which raw feel universals are trivially identical with 
certain brain state universals. Sellars' position, so inter-
preted, however, seems to be at odds with (R6). 
1
.QE.. cit., p. 46. 
2 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 81. 
a question of whether he 'takes' something to be·an 
after-image that is really not one.I 
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The reason why there cannot be a question under certain con-
ditions as to whether the assertion, "I see an after-image" 
is mistaken, he argues, is that there is no way of finding 
out the answer--not in the sense that there is some move 
which it is possible to make, but which we for some reason 
cannot make. There is nothing we would call "finding out 
the answer to such a question." This assertion "might be 
called 'self-confirming,' implying by this that really they 
have no confirmation. 112 Cook offers a similar defense of 
his claim that it makes no sense to speak of a person as not 
being in as good a position as one could want for correctly 
answering a certain question or making a certain statement 
about his pain. 
What is said to be senseless is not merely a combina-
tion of words but rather an attempt, by means of a 
combination of words, to make in one language game a 
move that belongs only to the other language game.3 
Arguments of this type appear also in Shoemaker's defense 
of the thesis of inocrrigibility. 
That a [first-person present-tense phenomenal state-
ment] is a sincere assertion is itself a logically 
111 oirect Perception," in his Knowledge and Certainty 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 85. 
2Ib'., -~•I p. 81. 
3o . ..... .,00 ~· ~., p. ~ • 
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sufficient condition of its being true, and that ·such 
a statement has been asserted with apparent sincerity 
is itself criterial evidence that it is true.l 
By "criterial evidence" for the truth of a judgment, Shoe-
maker means evidence which is such that "the assertion that 
it is evidence in favor of the truth of the judgment 
is necessarily (logically) rather than contingently (empiri-
cally} true." 2 
I think that critics of ME.TI have been right to point 
out the inadequacy of this type of argument~ but I also 
think that they have made things too easy for themselves by 
ignoring other aspects of the incorrigibilist defense. There 
are clear indications in the writings of many incorrigibil-
ists that they are themselves dissatisfied with such argu-
ments and regard them as effective only within the context 
of a more extended defense. That incorrigibilists have in 
mind a more extended defense is even suggested, apart from 
such clear indications, by their position with respect 
to (R2}, (R3}, and the arguments by analogy often given in 
support of (R5} and (R6}. So far from holding CR2) and (R3} 
to be incompatible with MET!, they are among their most 
1 2£.· cit., p. 216. 2Ibid., p. 4. 
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vigorous advocates. (R2) and (R3) find expression, for 
example, in Wittgenstein's remark 
What we have to mention in order to explain the signif-
icance, I mean the importance, of a concept, are often 
extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are 
hardly ever mentioned because of their great general-
ity. l 
Shoemaker appeals to analogues of (R2) and (R3) dealing with 
the concepts of perception and memory in the course of de-
fending a thesis of (general) incorrigibility with respect 
to first-person present-tense perceptual and memory state-
2 
ments. And Malcolm shows his firm commitment to (R2) and 
(R3) in the following passages: 
Our concepts of sensation and emotion, of belief and 
doubt, grow out of certain regular patterns of behavior 
and circumstances that are frequently repeated in 
human life.3 
[Dream-telling is] a remarkable human phenomenon, a part 
of the natural history of man, something given, the 
foundation for the concept of dreaming.4 
The plausibility of (R5) and (R6) rests, to a large extent, 
1 QE_. cit., p. 56. See also sec. 142 and p. 230. 
2see op. cit., pp. 236-243. 
311 The Privacy of Experience," p. 153. 
4o . 87 reaming, p. • 
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on arguments by analogy. Putnam, for example, who is a vig-
orous partisan of (R5), argues by analogy with names of 
diseases that "'pain' is a cluster-concept," by which he 
means that "the application of the word 'pain' is controlled 
by a whole cluster of criteria, all of which can be re-
. ~rded ~synthetic. 111 And Rorty, who could with reason be 
2 counted among the chief architects of (R6) , argues by 
analogy with demons, devils, Zeus's thunderbolts, and caloric 
fluid that the future progress of psycho-physiology may lead 
to the replacement of sensation discourse with brain-dis-
3 
course. Now none of the incorrigibilists mentioned above 
have ever denied the facts of which these analogies are 
based. Such facts, indeed, are underscored in the philoso-
phy of Wittgenstein. In an effort to distinguish clearly 
111 Brains and Behaviour," in R. J. Butler, ed., Analyti-
cal Philosophy (Second Series) (Oxford: Basil Blackwel~, 
!%5), p. 5. See also "Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar,'" in 
R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy (First Series) 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 218-221. 
2Although Rorty explicitly uses (R4) to criticize METI, 
there is a strong suggestion in his writings of criticism 
along the lines of (R6). And the latter sort of criticism 
seems to be a more natural development of his general posi-
tion on the Mind-Body Identity Theory. Were he convinced 
that (R4) was impotent against METI, I think it clear that 
he would fall back on (RG). 
3see "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories." 
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his own position from what he calls "logical behaviourism" 
(under which title he seems to lump together the in many ways 
widely divergent positions of Ryle, Strawson, Wittgenstein, 
Wisdom, and Malcolm) , Putnam further explains his notion of 
a "cluster-concept" as follows: 
I mean not only that each criterion can be regarded 
as synthetic, but also that the cluster is collective-
ly synthetic, in the sense that we are free in certain 
cases to say (for reason of inductive simplicity and 
theoretical economy) that the term applies although the 
whole cluster is missing. This is completely compati-
ble with saying that the cluster serves to fix the 
meaning of the word.l 
How different is such a notion from Wittgenstein's doctrine 
of family resemblances--so central to his philosophy--accord-
ing to which a term can be extended gradually to cover cases 
which have nothing at all in common with those it originally 
2 
covered? Putnam uses his notion of a "cluster-concept" 
against what he calls "the 'change of meaning' account," 
according to which any change of criteria involves a change 
of meaning. On such an account criteria for the presence 
and character of phenomenal states which make it senseless 
to suppose that a given person does not enjoy incorrigibility 
vis-a-vis these states cannot be replaced by criteria 
111 Brains and Behaviour," p. 5, n • 
... 
~See op. cit., secs. 65-67. 
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which do not make this supposition senseless without chang-
ing the meaning of phenomenal state terms. The "change of 
meaning" account is a straw man. Neither Wittgenstein nor 
Malcolm (against both of whom Putnam seems to be arguing) 
held such a view. Wittgenstein, on the contrary, explicitly 
rejected the "change of meaning" account. Arguing against 
Russell, whom he takes to have held this view, he rejects 
saying in certain cases that a term acquires a different 
sense according as we assume one definition or another in 
favor of saying in these cases that we use the term "with-
out a fixed meaning." 1 By using terms "without a fixed 
meaning," he is not talking about the ambiguity of terms 
but about indeterminateness of meaning. Changes in meaning 
can occur without change of meaning in cases where meaning 
is indeterminate. That he intends to include scientific 
terms, such as Putnam's names of diseases, among such cases 
is clear from the remark he appends to his argument against 
Russell: 
The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what to-
day counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon 
1Ibid., sec. 79. 
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A will be tomorrow used to define 'A. 11 
The facts about the use of scientific terms upon which Put-
nam bases his argument against the thesis of incorrigibility 
were pointed out by Wittgenstein as early as 1933, when he 
dictated the "Blue Book." And, it is interesting to note, 
he employed the very same examples of scientific terms to 
which Putnam appeals in his support of (R5). 2 
Doctors will use names of diseases without ever 
deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria 
and which as symptoms; and this need not be a deplora-
ble lack of clarity. For remember that in general 
we don't use language according to strict rules--it 3 hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. 
Putnam cites no passages from Wittgenstein which might serve 
as evidence that he ever held the "change of meaning" ac-
count. Indeed, his attribution of this account to so-
called "logical behaviorists" in general seems to be based 
1Ibid. I have given here the literal translation of 
Wittgenstein's remark, since I think the translator's ren-
dering is misleading. Wittgenstein is talking about the 
fluctuating definitions of terms, not of objects or events. 
2Putnam's use of the same examples may have been deliber-
ate. If so, I think he may have misunderstood the point 
Wittgenstein was trying to make by means of them, viz. that 
fluctuating definitions of scientific terms do not lead 
necessarily to change of meaning. If he did not misunder-
stand Wittgenstein's.point, then, on the assumption that his 
use of these examples was deliberate, I have certainly mis-
understood Putnam. 
3The Blue and Brown Books, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: 
Basil -Blackwe1i";-T958), p. 25. 
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solely.on passages taken from Malcolm's monograph Dreaming. 
Let us examine very briefly two of these passages. 
With adults and older children there are two criteria 
of behaviour and [sinere] testimony; with animals and 
human infants there is only the one criterion of be-
haviour. The concept of sleep is not exactly the same 
in the two cases.I 
Considering the radical conceptual changes that the 
adoption of a physiological criterion of dreaming 
would entail, it is evident that a new concept would 
have been created that only remotely resembled the old 
one.2 
The point of the first passage, says Putnam, is that "there 
are two concepts of sleep, because there are two methods 
of verification. 113 Now, the italics notwithstanding, nothing 
of significance turns on the issue of whether it is more 
proper to speak of a concept c1 and a concept c2 as one con-
cept or as two concepts if c1 is not exactly the same as c2 • 
How we individuate concepts depends upon our criteria of 
individuation, and our selection of the latter seems to be 
f b . h . 4 a matter o ar itrary c oice. What the first passage must 
1 P. 23. 2 P. 81. 
311 Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar,'" p. 211. 
4our ordinary concept of a person is indeterminate in 
the respect that the criteria for its application leave 
open the question of whether a four-month-old fetus is a 
person. Suppose we introduce a criterion which further 
determines our ordinary concept in this res·pect. Have we 
now changed our ordinary concept of a person or have we 
creat~d a ne'l.·1 concept of a person? I am not suggesting, 
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imply, or at least suggest, if it is to be evidence for a 
"change of meaning" account which can bear the weight of ar-
guments against (R5) is that in one of the cases the concept 
for which the word "asleep" is used is not a concept of 
sleep at all. This is neither implied nor suggested. In-
deed, Malcolm implicitly rejects such a suggestion when, a 
few lines later, he claims that "we should have two totally 
1 different senses of 'alseep, 111 if behavior were not a cri-
terion of sleep in the case of adults and older children. 
The second passage does imply that the word "dreaming" could 
no longer be used for the concept of dreaming at all if its 
application came to be determined by a physiological cri-
terion. But this is not because any change of criteria 
involves a change of meaning but because this particular 
change would entail "radical" conceptual changes. The 
other passages Putnam cites from Malcolm2 as evidence that 
the latter holds--or, at least, at one time held--the 
"change of meaning" account are even less conclusive. I do 
of course, that the introduction of such a criterion would 
be a matter of arbitrary choice. 
1oreaming, p. 24. 
~"Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar,'" pp. 211-213. 
127 
not think there is need to spend much time showing how truly 
unimpressive to incorrigibilists are the arguments in sup-
port of (R6) based on the history of such concepts as 
demons, devils, Zeus's thunderbolts, and caloric fluid. Is 
it to be supposed that incorrigibilists are unacquainted with 
the phenomenon of the discovery, abandonment, and eventual 
loss of a concept? Wittgenstein takes note of this phenome-
non in the following remark: 
••• new types of language, new language-games, as we 
may say, come into existence, and others become obso-
lete and forgotten.I 
That incorrigibilists strongly support some of the 
views and readily accept the facts on which their critics 
try to build a case against METI is a difficulty these crit-
ics seem to have overlooked. To dismiss this difficulty as 
just another indication of the inconsistency or, perhaps, 
of the "consistent delusional system" 2 of "logical behavior-
ists" would be a mistake. For it points the way to an 
understanding of the extended defense of METI. Generally, 
the extended defense consists in arguments designed to show 
that neither (R2) nor (R3) is incompatible with METI and 
1 2E_. cit., sec. 23. 
2see Putnam, "Brains and Behaviour," p. 19. 
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that (R5 ) and (R6) are both false.
1 More specifically, 
it consists in arguments for two claims: (1) neither (R2) 
nor (R3) implies that any component of the thesis of incor-
rigibility is either a bare tautology or true in virtue of 
linguistic conventions modifiable in the light of future 
empirical inquiry, and (2) no component of the thesis of 
incorrigibility is either a bare tautology or true in vir-
tue of linguistic conventions modifiable in the light of 
future empirical inquiry. The general argument for (1) pro-
ceeds in two stages: it (~) tries to make a case for dis-
tinguishing non-empirical truths which do not express a 
necessary condition for the existence of our conceptual 
scheme, such as "Demons are intangible" and "Epileptics 
are under the spell of a demon," from non-empirical truths 
which do express such a condition and (b) contends that the 
latter are neither bare tautologies nor true in virtue of 
linguistic conventions modifiable in the light of future 
empirical inquiry. The general argument for (2) is that the 
thesis of incorrigibility expresses a necessary condition 
1That (R1) is false and that (R4) is not incompatible 
with METI are generally assumed without argument. I do not 
think it difficult, however, to construct good arguments for 
both of these claims. I try to do so below. 
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for the existence of our conceptual scheme. This argument 
also proceeds in two stages: it contends (~) that the con-
cept of a person is basic to our conceptual scheme and (b) 
that the thesis of incorrigibility expresses a necessary con-
dition for the existence of this concept. 
Allusions to the extended defense are easily discerni-
ble in the writings of most of the incorrigibilists men-
tioned above. Anscombe makes it clear, for example, how she 
would defend her claim that there is no possibility of a per-
son's being wrong in what he says about his pain against the 
objection that a conflict between the two criteria of behav-
ior and testimony is possible, and such a conflict,. since 
the former criterion has greater weight than the latter, 
would show a person to be wrong in what he says about his 
pain. She suggests that such a conflict would not show the 
falsehood of what is said but would make what is said unin-
telligible. 1 This sort of reply, if intended to stand 
alone, is of course vulnerable to criticism along the lines 
of (R2)-(R6). That Anscombe intends this reply to be 
understood within the context of the extended defense is 
1
.Qe.. cit., p. 14. 
130 
indicated by the distinction she is careful to draw between 
the unintelligibility of what is said and the unintelligi-
bility of the person who says it. In the case of such a 
conflict, she explains while discussing an analogous situa-
tion, the person's words would be unintelligible, "not be-
cause one did not know what they meant, but because one could 
not make out what the man meant by saying them [W]e 
cannot understand such a man. 111 That there is no possibil-
ity of a person's being wrong in what he says about his pain, 
accordingly, is to be explained not be reference to what 
pain is but by reference to what a person is. One of the 
clearest indications of the extended defense appears in the 
recent essay by Malcolm from which I have taken the passage 
used at the outset of this chapter to introduce the thesis 
of incorrigibility. Malcolm writes: 
What I conceive to be a kind of explanation [of the gram-
mar of sensation], and one that satisfies me, is to see 
what the consequences would be for our concept of a 
person, if the grammar of sensation (or of thinking 
or intending) were different in the respect that the 
expression of doubt, which has no2place in the language-game, ~ to have a place in it. 
1
rbid., pp. 26-27. 
211 The Privacy of Experience," pp. 151-152. 
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The explanation [of why the expression of doubt is ex-
cluded from language] is that [it] could not fit co-
herently into the structure of our concept of a person. 
The excluding it from working language is no superfi-
cial point of grammar or semantics, but a matter of 
deep philosophical importance.l 
Malcolm's appeal to the extended defense is not, as it may 
perhaps appear to be, a recent development grafted onto his 
former arguments for the sake of answering his critics. 
There is evidence of such an appeal in his monograph Dream-
ing, apparently overlooked by Putnam in his severe criticism 
of that work. Malcolm's explanation of why the word "dream-
ing" could no longer be used for the concept of dreaming at 
all if its application came to be determined by a physio-
logical criterion is that 
••• what were then called 'dreams' would no longer 
be of interest to poets, psychoanalysts, philosophers, 
and to all of2us, children and adults, who like a strange tale. 
What are now called "dreams" are of interest to poets, 
psychoanalysts, etc., because a first-person dream-report 
reveals important information about the person making the 
report, beyond what it reveals about his behavior--his 
1rhid., pp. 154-155. 
2P. 81. 
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"dreaming habits." The consequence of adopting a physiologi-
cal criterion of dreaming is that a first-person dream-report 
would not reveal information about anything beyond the be-
havior of the person making the report. For the concept of 
a person, according to Malcolm, is such that to reveal infor-
mation about persons which go beyond information about their 
behavior, first-person dream-reports must be incorrigible, 
and the adoption of a physiological criterion of dreaming 
would entail their corrigibility. Thus the presupposition 
of Malcolm's explanation is that the corrigibility of first-
person dream-reports which report what are now called 
"dreams" could not fit coherently into the structure of our 
concept of a person. The elements of this explanation al-
ready appear in Wittgenstein's brief remarks on the concept 
of dreaming. Wittgenstein says: 
Assuming that dreams can yield important information 
about the dreamer, what yielded the information would 
be truthful accounts of dreams. The question whether 
the dreamer's memory deceives him when he reports the 
dream after waking cannot arise, unless indeed we 
introduce a completely new criterion for the reports 
'agreeing' with the dream, a criterion which gives 
us a concept of 'truth' as distinct from 'truthful-
ness' here.l 
1 QE_. cit., pp. 222-223. 
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That it would be possible to adopt a physiological criter-
ion of dreaming seems to be suggested by this passage. But 
the criterion could be employed only where the question 
whether the dreamer's memory deceives him when he reports 
a dream after waking can arise. And this question cannot 
arise where our interest is in the dreamer rather than in 
his behavior. 1 Allusions to the extended defense appear al-
so in Shoemaker's writings. That Shoemaker intends his 
arguments for the thesis of (general) incorrigibility with 
respect to first-person present-tense perceptual and memory 
statements to be understood within the context of the ex-
tended defense is indicated by the following passages, in 
which he suggests that this thesis expresses a necessary 
condition both for the existence of our conceptual scheme 
and for the existence of the concept of a person. 
It seems to me • • • that it follows from the logical 
possibility of anyone's knowing anything about the 
world that2perceptual and memory beliefs are gener-ally true. • • • [If human beings lacked the capac-
ity generally to make true perceptual and memory state-
ments] they would not make perceptual and memory state-
ments at all, could not be taught to make them, and 
could not be said to have beliefs that are expressible 
in. such statements.3 
1cf. ibid., pp. 179, 18~ and 190. 
2op. cit., p. 235. 3Ibid., p. 241. 
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If a group of human beings could not be taught, or 
trained, generally to make true perceptual and memory 
statements, they could not be said to perceive or 
remember at all in the sense in which persons do, and 
could hardly be said to be persons at all.l 
Shoemaker's arguments for the claims suggested in these 
passages are taken up and further developed by Coburn in his 
article cited earlier in which he defends the thesis of 
incorrigibility by calling attention to a number of absurdi-
ties that are supposed to follow from denying it. 
Failure to take account of the extended defense of METI 
has vitiated much of the criticism directed against it. Argu-
ments in favor of (R2 ) or (R3) do nothing to show that METI 
is incorrect unless they are accompanied by arguments which 
show that either the general argument for claim (1) of the 
extended defense or the general argument for claim (2) of 
the extended defense is incorrect. Now cogent arguments 
in favor of (R5) or (R6) would show that either one or both 
of these general arguments are incorrect, since METI is 
incompatible with both (R5) and (R6). There are serious 
objections to the arguments which have so far been given 
in favor of (R5) and (R6), however, arising from considera-
tions relevant to the extended defense of METI. These 
1rb·' .. ~ 1 p. 239. 
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are serious objections to the arguments which have so far 
been given in favor of (R5) and (R6), however, arising from 
considerations relevant to the extended defense of .METI. 
These objections seem to have been overlooked by most pro-
ponents of (R5 ) and (R6); at least, few attempts have been 
made to answer them. I will take up (R5 ) and (R6) in Chap-
ter 5. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to con-
sider (R1 ) and (R4). 
Arguments in favor of (R1) are either based on Hume's 
dictum that what is distinguishable is separable or consist 
in bringing forward alleged counterexamples to the thesis of 
incorrigibility, interpreted as a logical thesis. All argu-
ments of the first sort take the following general form: 
(H) (1) What is distinguishable is separable. 
(2) Phenomenal state x and the awareness of 
phenomenal state x are distinguishable. 
(3) Therefore, phenomenal state ~ and the 
awareness of phenomenal state ~ are 
separable. 
It follows from (3) that (at least) conjunct (£) of the 
thesis of incorrigibility is false, since phenomenal state 
x could exist in the absence of the awareness of phenomenal 
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state~' and conversely. 1 J. J. c. Smart and D. M. Arm-
strong, two prominent recent advocates of (R1), rely almost 
exclusively on arguments of this sort to make out their case 
2 for CR1 ). The trouble with such arguments is that, as they 
stand, they are all subject to reversal. If, as incorrigi-
bilists maintain, the thesis of incorrigibility is true, then 
either premise (1) of (H) is false or premise (2) of (H) 
takes only false propositions as values. What is needed are 
further arguments for premises (1) and (2) , but these are 
not provided. Clearly, premises (1) and (2) are not self-
evident. Consider premise (1). A grin, if I may be permitted 
to use one of Smart's own examples 3 (borrowed from Lewis 
Carroll) against him, is distinguishable but not separable 
from the mouth in the shape of a grin. If they were not dis-
tinguishable, then whatever is true of the grin would be 
true of the mouth in the shape of a grin. But, first, it 
1For convenience, I am here departing from the ordinary 
use of the term "awareness," according to which "A is aware 
of x" implies "There is an x of which A is aware." Nothing 
in my argument turns on this extended use of the term. 
2
see Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 100, and Armstrong, A 
Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1968), pp. 106-107. 
') 
~Ibid. I p. 4. 
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is true of the grin that it could only have been ascribed to 
a living being, but this is not true of the mouth in the 
h f . 1 s ape o a grin. Second, it is true of the grin that it 
could only have been ascribed to a person, but this is not 
true of the mouth in the shape of a grin. The obvious objec-
tion here is that in a fairy tale the cat too can grin. There 
is an obvious reply, however; it is that the grinning cat 
can also talk. The cat becomes a possible subject of grin-
2 
ascriptions by being made to resemble a person. Third, 
it is true of the grin that it requires "surroundings," but 
this is not true of the mouth in the shape of a grin. Thus, 
the mouth of a grimacing person could be correctly said to 
be in the shape of a grin in surroundings which rule out 
the possibility of a grin-ascription. 3 
Armstrong supports (R1 ) by an argument which, he says, 
"is meant to be an apodeictic disproof of the thesis of 
indubitability. 114 The "thesis of indubitability" is the 
1cf. Wittgenstein, S?.E· cit., secs. 284-285. 
2cf. ibid., secs. 281-282. 
3cf. ibid., secs. 536-539, 583, and 652. 
4
cf. ~* cit. , p. 106. 
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title Armstrong gives to the claim that propositions ascrib-
ing phenomenal states are logically indubitable for the per-
sons whose phenomenal states they are, where he defines "E. 
is logically indubitable for A" as follows: 
(i) A believes E 
(ii) (A's belief that E.) logically implies (E,) • 1 
Thus Armstrong's thesis of indubitability is a version of 
what I have called the "thesis of incorrigibility," got from 
the latter by eliminating conjuncts (~) and (b) and interpret-
ing conjunct (c) as a logical thesis. The following is his 
"apodeictic disproof" of the thesis of indubitability. 
• • • let us consider the mechanical analogue of aware-
ness of our own mental states; the scanning by a mecha-
nism of its own internal states. It is clear here that 
the operation of scanning and the situation scanned must 
be 'distinct existences.' ••• Consider an eye 
(taken solely as a mechanism) scanning itself by means 
of a mirror. Certain features of the eye, such as 
its color and shape, will register on the eye. But 
the registering will have to be something logically 
distinct from the features that are registered • • • • 
Why should the substitution of spiritual for material 
substance abolish the need for a distinction between 
object and subject? I must admit that I can see no way 
to prove that there must be such a parallelism, which 
is a lacuna in my argument. But it seems clear that 
the natural view to take is that pain and awareness of 
pain are 'distinct existences.' If so, a false aware-
ness of pain is at least logically possible.2 
Armstrong employs here an argument by analogy with self-
1IJ:?id., p. 101. 2rbid., pp. 106-07. 
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scanning mechanisms based on the logical distinction between 
object and subject, between the "being acted on," and the 
"acting on," to establish the universal generalization of 
step (2) in (H) above, from which he infers the universal 
. generalization of step (3) in (H). The argument is thus 
an enthymeme whose suppressed premise is step (1) in (H) 
and which, when fully stated, would take the form of {H). 
Armstrong, like Smart, sees no need to support step (1). 
Yet, Armstrong's own example, like Smart's example earlier, 
seems under closer scrutiny to indicate that step (1) is 
far from self-evident. If step (1) were self-evident, then 
. granting that the "registering" of color and shape on the 
eye is logically distinct from the color and shape regis-
tered, it would also be self-evident that they were "dis-
tinct existences." But much of the philosophy of percep-
tion consists in arguments designed to show either that 
they are "distinct existences" or that they are not. And 
there are philosophers on opposite sides of the issue who 
share in common the view that there is some sort of logical 
distinction between them. 
Armstrong's example of an eye scanning itself casts 
doubt even on the self-evidence of ste_p (2). Clearly, it 
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is not self-evident in the case of a self-scanning eye--or 
even in the case of an eye scanning something other than 
itself--that the color "registered" is related to the activ-
ity of the eye as object to subject, as "being acted on" 
to "acting on." To maintain that it is self-evident is 
to beg the question against the adverbial view of percep-
tion, according to which colors, sounds, smells, etc., are 
not objects of perception at all but only ways of perceiv-
ing. This view is not lightly to be dismissed; its creden-
tials are impressive and go back at least as far as Descar-
tes, who considered colors, sounds, smells, etc. to be no 
more than 11 modes 11 of thought. 1 Now sentences ascribing 
phenomenal states such as pain are even more plausible candi-
dates for adverbial analysis; indeed, it is part of the ad-
verbial view of perception that feeling pain is just another 
way of perceiving. If the adverbial view is correct, step 
(2) of (H) takes only false propositions as values. There 
is no need on this view for a distinction between, for 
example, feeling a pain and the pain felt, just as there is 
no need for a distinction between dancing a jig and the jig 
1see Meditations, III, and Principles of Philosophy, I, 
65 (HR, I, 160, 161 and 246). 
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danced. 
The arguments in favor of (R1 ) which consist in bringing 
forward alleged counterexamples to the thesis of incorrigi-
bility, interpreted as a logical thesis, seem to me to suf-
fer from one or the other of two general failings. In the 
guise of "inferences" from a set of propositions describing 
conceivable or actual situations, exponents of these argu-
ments are in fact proposing either re-descriptions of phen-
omena which are presently described in some other way or 
descriptions for phenomena which are so abnormal that it is 
at present doubtful how they are to be described. To defend 
this claim satisfactorily, it would be necessary to examine 
all such arguments individually. This, of course, would be 
an impossible task. It will be useful, however, to glance 
at a few such arguments, to see how they are affected by 
these failings. Consider the three alleged counterexamples 
offered by Bruce Aune, a prominent advocate of (R1) who does 
not rely on Humean-type arguments, in his recent book, Knowl-
edge, Mind, and Nature. 1 Aune takes his three counterexam-
ples to establish not merely that the thesis of incorrigibility 
1 (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 31-38. 
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is false if interpreted as a logical thesis, but false even 
if interpreted as expressing a de facto universality. 
They establish, he claims, that this thesis is false insofar 
as it is meant to express anything more than an extremely 
high probability restricted to normal conditions. 1 Aune 
bases his first counterexample on "the verbal behavior of 
hebephrenic schizophrenics," people who "pour out chaotic 
jumbles of words, which often appear to be utterly unrelat-
d .. 2 e • He regards the total confusion of such behavior as 
evidence that the conscious thinking of these people is also 
totally confused and this, in turn, as evidence that they 
make mistaken identifications of even their own feelings 
and mental images. It should be clear, I think, that this 
argument suffers from the first general failing mentioned 
above. Chaotic jumbles of thoughts are no more to be count-
ed as the making of identifications, much less the making 
of mistaking identifications, then are chaotic jumbles of 
words. In his second argument, Aune describes a possible 
experiment in which a man gives a self-contradictory report 
of his present mental image. Upon being asked to read off 
the image he claims to have from his recent scrutiny of 
, 
·see ibid., p. 37. 2Ibid. I p. 33. 
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the letter-square 
e m f 
r z a 
0 w p 
the man makes, sincerely and with confidence, the following 
three assertions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The image did not change during the experiment. 
From left to right, top to bottom, the letters 
were: e, m, f, r, z, a, o, w, p. 
From right to left, bottom to topi the letters 
were: p, w, o, E. 1 ~' ~, f, m, e. 
Aune infers from the inconsistency of this sequence of as-
sertions that the man must be mistaken either about the 
existence of the image he claims to have or about its charac-
ter. 
Now, if he has the image he claims to have, not all 
three of these assertions can be true of it; at least 
one must be mistaken. Whichever it is, we know that 
he has made a mistake about the character of his experi-
ence. 2 
This argument appears to suffer from the second general fail-
ing mentioned above. Clearly, Aune's "inference" is not 
the only possible one in the circumstances. One could just 
as well infer that, although each assertion individually 
can serve as the report of a mental image, the whole sequence 
of assertions does not constitute the report of anything, much 
1
rbid., pp. 34-35. 
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less the mistaken report of a mental image. Any preference 
for one inference over the other would be entirely arbitrary. 
The counterexample Aune offers in his third argument is 
based on some of the experiments actually performed on con-
. genitally blind adults whose vision has been restored by 
surgery. These patients, it was found, often have an ex-
tremely difficult time visually discriminating squares from 
' triangles and even spheres from cubes. Aune infers from the 
mistakes they make in visually discriminating physical shapes 
that they must be making mistakes in discriminating their 
visual impressions. 
Though the shapes in point were physical ones, an 
empiricist could scarcely deny that the patients 
had the appropriate visual impressions.l 
The failing of this argument is harder to classify. It 
falls somewhere between the first and second general fail-
ings. On the one hand, the reply might be that one could 
just as well infer that these patients are experiencing 
chaotic jumbles of visual impressions which only after 
a period of time first become "appropriate" for discriminat-
ing physical shapes. On the other hand, this "inference" 
1rbid., p. 36. 
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would seem to be the more natural one to make, in view of 
the similarity of such phenomena to the symptoms of vertigo. 
Consider now the criticism of METI which takes the form 
of (R4). The force of (R4) is that the thesis of incorri-
. gibility does nothing to show that persons are in a special-
ly favorable epistemic position vis-a-vis their own current 
phenomenal states, because one of its crucial components, 
conjunct £ 1 is a bare tautology. (R4) alone, however, does 
not imply the lack of epistemic and, hence, metaphysical sig-
nificance of the thesis of incorrigibility. That sincere 
reports of something about which it is impossible to be mis-
taken can nevertheless justifiably be over-ridden does not 
imply that the statement expressing this impossibility is a 
bare tautology. Indeed, incorrigibilists have not denied 
that one's sincere reports of one's own current phenomenal 
states can justifiably be over-ridden but, on the contrary, 
have tried to show that they can. Anscombe suggests, as I 
noted earlier, 1 that although a conflict between the two 
criteria of behavior and testimony would not show a person 
to be wrong in what he says about his pain, it would make 
1 See supra, pp. 129-30. 
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what he says unintelligible. This is a point Malcolm makes 
1 
also. The clearest indication of Malcolm's position regard-
ing (R4) appears in his essay on after-images in which (R4) 
is explicitly affirmed and defended by appeal to several 
kinds of cases in which it would be justifiable to over-ride 
first-person present-tense after-image reports. 
When I say that [after-image descriptions and reports] 
are 'incorrigible' I do not imply ••• that anything 
whatever that is offered as a description of an after-
image should be accepted without question. If it were 
self-contradictory we should not regard it as a per-
fectly good, although unusual, description of an after-
image. If we found that someone constantly misused 
certain color adjectives in his descriptions of physical 
realities, then we should not accept at face value his 
after-image descriptions containing those adjectives. 
If there was any language at all whose use in relation 
to physical realities he had not mastered, then we 
should disallow his use of it in an alleged after-image 
report.2 
That Wittgenstein would also subscribe to (R4) is clear from 
his remark that if someone said "'Oh, I know what 'pain' 
means; what I don't know is whether this, that I have now, 
is pain'--we should merely shake our heads and be forced to 
regard his words as a queer reaction which we have no idea 
to do with. 113 The critics of .METI who rely on (R4), however, 
1see "The Privacy of Experience," p. 136. 
211 Direct Perception," p. 83. 
3QE_. cit., sec. 288. 
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do not intend that (R4) be considered alone. 
considered together with a certain argument in its favor. 
In the light of this argument, it is maintained, (R4) does 
imply the lack of epistemic and, hence, metaphysical signif-
icance of the thesis of incorrigibility. The argument in 
question is a version of what has come to be called the 
"electroencephalogram (EEG) argument." This version of the 
EEG argument was originally formulated by Rorty1 and has 
recently been revived by Harold Morick. 2 Since Morick's 
formulation of the argument adds nothing to Rorty's but on 
the contrary is only a highly compressed version of it, I 
will focus my remarks on Rorty's original formulation. 
The argument begins with the claim that advances in 
physiology and electroencephalography which resulted in a 
well-confirmed theory correlating brain-processes with 
phenomenal states would lead to a situation in which the 
111Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," pp. 41-
48. 
211 Is Ultimate Epistemic Authority a Distinguishing Char-
acteristic of the Psychological?," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 292-293. Although Morick tries 
to show in this article that the EEG argument establishes 
less than its proponents think it does, he-takes it to 
establish the "merely tautological" character of conjunct £ 
of the thesis of incorrigibility. 
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"'final epistemological authority• [of sincere first-per-
son present-tense reports of phenomenal states] would be 
. gone, for there would be a standard procedure for over-
riding our reports. 111 The next step is a reply to a certain 
objection which incorrigibilists are expected to raise 
against this claim. This objection consists in asserting 
conjunct £ of the thesis of incorrigibility together with 
the claim that conjunct £ is incompatible with the possi-
bility of justifiably over-riding sincere first-person pres-
2 
ent-tense reports of phenomenal states. The reply to this 
objection is that a person's sincere reports can justifiably 
be over-ridden not only if there is good reason to think 
that they are false but also if there is good reason to 
think that he does not understand the words he is using, and 
in the situation envisaged there could be good reason to 
think that someone does not know how to use phenomenal state 
3 terms correctly. It is in the course of this reply that an 
1QE.. cit., p. 47. 
2To expect incorrigibilists to make such an objection, 
as I have just indicated, shows a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of their position. 
3That such a truism should be thought·to be an effec-
tive reply to the incorrigibilist position I find most puz-
zling. Incorrigibilists would simply grant it and add that 
even in the present situation there could be good reason 
to think that someone does not know how to use phenomenal 
state terms correctly. 
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argument appears for the merely tautological character of 
conjunct c. The argument is restricted to the case of pains 
but is meant to apply generally to all sensations. The 
heart of this argument is contained in the following passage: 
• the claim that 'such a mistake is inconceivable' 
is an ellipsis for the claim that a mistake, made by 
one who knows what pain is, is inconceivable, for only 
this expanded form will entail that when Jones and 
the encephalograph disagree, Jones is always right. 
But when formulated in this way out infallibility 
about our pains can be seen to be empty. Being infalli-
ble about something would be useful only if we could 
draw the usual distinction between misnaming and mis-
judging, and, having ascertained that we were not mis-
naming, know that we were not misjudging. But where 
there are no criteria for misjudging (or to put it more 
accurately, where in the crucial cases the criteria 
for misjudging turn out to be the same as the criteria 
for misnaming), then to say that we are infallible 
is to pay ourselves an empty compliment.I 
The argument in this passage may be set out as follows: 
The statement 
s1 : P (a person) cannot be mistaken in thinking that 
he has a pain 
is elliptical for 
s2 : If P knows what "pain" means, P cannot be mis-
taken in thinking that he has a pain. 
Rorty calls s2 "empty" and implies that it is "useless." 
Morick speaks of s2 as "merely tautological," "analytic," 
1Ibid., p. 45. 
---
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and "trivial." Let 
(1) s2 is trivially true 
represent these claims. Now Rorty claims that (1) follows 
from 
(2) There is no distinction between misnaming and 
misjudging in the case of "I am in pain, 11 
which, in turn, follows from either 
(3) There are no criteria for misjudging in the case 
of "I am in pain" 
or 
(4) The criteria for misjudging are the same as the 
criteria for misnaming in the case of II I am in 
pain. 11 
( 4) I Rorty says, is only a "more accurate" version of ( 3) • 
To support (3) and ( 4) I Rorty describes a case which, he 
claims, shows that (3) and (4) are both true. In this 
case someone who has not been burned before exhibits pain-
behavior while being burned but sincerely denies that he 
feels pain. "But, now as in the past, he both exhibits 
pain-behavior and thinks that he feels pain when he is 
frozen, stuck, struck, racked, etc. 111 When he is told 
1Ibid. I p. 44. 
151 
that what he feels when he is burned is also called "pain," 
II 
he admits that he does feel something, but insists that what 
he feels is quite different from what he feels when he is 
stuc~ struck, etc. 111 
I want to examine this argument. I will begin by call-
ing into question Rorty's claim that s1 is elliptical for 
82 • Rorty supports this claim, as the quoted passage shows, 
by maintaining that 81 is held because it is thought to en-
tail 
83 : Whenever P thinks that he has a pain, P is right. 
81 , however, does not as it stands entail 8 3• Only when 81 
is expanded to s 2 is this entailment secured. Rorty is 
partly right and partly wrong. It is true that 81 does not 
entail 8 3 , but neither does s 2 entail 83• 82 is clearly 
consistent with 
8 4 : P is wrong in thinking that he has a pain. 
For P may not know what "pain" means. Rorty's mistake is one 
1rbid. Rorty supposes this case to occur at a time 
when there is a well-confirmed theory correlating brain-
processes with pains. The existence of such a theory, 
however, is an inessential feature of the case. For Rorty, 
like Morick, does not hold that our inability to be mistaken 
about our pains is relative to a given stage of empirical 
inquiry, although, unlike Morick, he holds that our "final 
epistemological authority" is so relative (see ibid., p. 
47). --
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of bracketing incorrectly. s1 does entail s3 provided that 
s5 : P knows what "pain" means. 
But this should not be construed as asserting 
but rather 
Now the second expression is indeed equivalent to 
So we could say, were we to grant that s1 is held because 
it is thought to entail s 3 , that s1 is elliptical for 
(s5 • s1 ). But since (s5 • s1 ) is clearly not trivial, we 
could not then go to say that s1 is elliptical for .a trivial 
assertion. 
There are other difficulties with Rorty's argument. 
It is important to notice that (2) is ambiguous. (2) can 
be understood to mean either 
(5) The distinction between misnaming and misjudging 
does not apply to "I am in pain111 
or 
1Morick understands (2) in this sense. See op. cit., 
p. 292. 
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(6) To misname is to misjudge in the case of "I am 
in pain. 111 
Consider (5). Although (5) does follow from either (3) or 
(4), (1) does not follow from (5). If (1) did follow from 
(5), one could argue analogously that 
(7) "If N (a number) is not red, N cannot be even" 
is trivially true 
follows from 
(8) The distinction between being red and being even 
does not apply to.numbers. 
Replacing (5) by (6) does not help the argument in this re-
gard and indeed adds to its difficulties. For neither does 
(1) follow from (6). Otherwise, one could argue that 
(9) "If X is not the Evening Star, X cannot be the 
Morning Star" is trivially true 
follows from 
(10) The Evening Star is the Morning Star. 
Further, (6) does not follow from (3). This form of argument 
1Rorty seems to vacillate between these two ways of un-
derstanding (2). His asserting (3) suggests that he under-
stands (2) in the sense of (5), but his asserting (4) sug-
. gests that he understands (2) in the sense of (6). 
154 
permits the inference from 
to 
(11) There are no criteria for being red in the case 
of (the number) "2" 
(12) To be even is to be red in the case of (the num-
ber) "2." 
Now (6) does follow from (4). But Rorty's argument in favor 
of (4) is at best a weak one and at worst irrelevant. One 
cannot establish that the criteria for the application of a 
description d1 are the same as the criteria for the applica-
tion of a description d2 by citing cases in which the cri-
teria do not determine which of d1 or d2 is to be preferred. 
The case Rorty presents us with, however, does not even seem 
to be of this sort but rather one in which the phenomena 
are so abnormal that it is doubtful whether either d1 or 
d2 has an application or one in which, since there is a con-
flict of criteria (for being in pain), no description has an 
application other than "the phenomena are unintelligible." 
CHAPTER V 
INCORRIGIBILITY AND THE EEG ARGUMENT 
One of the ways in which proponents of the Mind-Body 
Identity Theory have replied to objections based on the 
thesis of incorrigibility is to challenge the significance 
of this thesis. The four general positions I have called 
R1-R4 are different forms this challenge has taken. R1-R3 
are supported by Humean arguments, arguments by analogy, 
and alleged counterexamples to the thesis of incorrigibility 
and R4 by the electroencephalogram (EEG) argument. In Chap-
ter IV, I examined these arguments and alleged counterexam-
ples and concluded that they fell short of establishing the 
positions they support. A second line of reply to objections 
based on the thesis of incorrigibility is that it would be 
reasonable in the light of future scientific advances to 
eliminate in principle incorrigibility in.the sense in which 
it cannot be a feature of physiological statements. The 
. general positions I have called Rs and R6 are different forms 
of this reply. Identity Theorists rely almost entirely on 
the EEG argument to make out their case for Rs and R6 • 
In the present chapter, I will try to show that the EEG 
argument does not establish either of these positions or even 
lSS 
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provide some reason for thinking that one of them is true. 
There will be no need to consider these positions separately, 
for my argument is intended to show that the EEG argument 
does not establish or even provide some reason for thinking 
true one of the two claims essential to both positions, viz., 
that additions to our stock of empirical knowledge together 
with advances in technology could lead to the elimination 
in principle of the feature of incorrigibility. 1 I will 
conclude my discussion by considering whether any argument 
could establish or provide some reason for thinking that this 
claim is true. Respecting this question, I will argue that 
the logical differences between explanation-types pointed 
out in Chapters II and III which make doubtful the possibili-
ty of eliminating sensation-statements also make doubtful the 
possibility of eliminating incorrigibility as a feature of 
these statements. Heretofore the issue of incorrigibility 
has been debated as if it were decidable independently of 
considerations pertaining to the logical similarities and 
differences between explanation-types. No really important 
philosophical issue can be decided, however, independently 
1For an account of the claims common to both R5 and R6 
and peculiar to each, see supra, Chapter IV, pp. 113-14. 
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of the way in which a great many other philosophical issues 
are decided. One of my aims is to show that incorrigibility 
is such an issue. 
As things are, say proponents of the EEG argument, no 
one can be in a position to override a person's honestly 
avowed reports about the existence and character of his own 
current sensations. That no one can be in such a position, 
however, is merely contingent on the present state of empiri-
cal inquiry. There are no accepted procedures by applying 
which it would be rational to override a person's honest 
avowal of sensation. Advances in physiology and technology, 
however, could lead to a well-confirmed theory correlating 
sensations with brain processes. In such circumstances, it 
is claimed, it would be rational to override a person's hon-
est avowal of sensation on the basis of a conflicting EEG 
report (provided there was not a sizable accumulation of 
conflicts between similar avowals of other people and EEG 
reports). To say that it would be rational to override such 
an avowal, of course, does not rule out the possibility that 
the avowal might be correct after all. 
There are serious difficulties with the foregoing posi-
tion •. I want to discuss two such difficulties. The fi£st 
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is not serious in itself but nevertheless deserves some at-
tention, since it is connected with what is, I think, an 
obviously mistaken view of our epistemic position vis-a-vis 
our own current sensations. The second deserves a great 
deal more attention and will occupy most of the discussion 
in this chapter. The first difficulty is this. It is not 
true that as things are no one can be in a position to over-
ride a person's honestly avowed reports about the existence 
and character of his own current sensations. There are 
criteria whose satisfaction establishes that a word is being 
used incorrectly, and anyone who is in a position to observe 
that these criteria have been satisfied on a certain occa-
sion is in a position to override the report made by using 
the word on that occasion. It might be thought that this 
difficulty can be easily removed by adding a proviso to the 
original assertion: As things are no one can be in a posi-
tion to override a person's honestly avowed reports about 
the existence or character of his own current sensations, 
if that person is granted mastery of the words used to make 
these reports. The trouble with this suggestion, however, 
is that some proponents of the EEG argurnen~ hold the view 
that anycnc ·who grants a person mastery of the words he uses 
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to make honestly avowed reports of his own current sensa-
tions is logically precluded from rejecting or even doubt-
ing these reports, because it is "merely tautological" that 
a mistake about one's own current sensations made by one who 
knows the meaning of the words for these sensations is incon-
ceivable • 
• • • 'such a mistake is inconceivable' is elliptical 
for 'such a mistake made ~~who knows what 'pain' 
means is inconceivable.' And that assertion is merely 
tautological •••• 1 ~~ 
If these proponents of the EEG argument are right, the 
assertion resulting from adding the proviso "if that person 
were granted mastery of the words used to make these reports" 
expresses not only how things are but how they always were 
and always will be. For surely if our present epistemic 
position vis-a-vis our own current sensations is grounded 
in a mere tautology, no changes in the world whatever could 
lead to any change in this position. But the purpose of the 
EEG argument is to show how some changes in the world could 
1Harold Morick, "Is Ultimate Epistemic Authority a 
Distinguishing Characteristic of the Psychological?," Ameri-
can Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), p. 292. See 
also Richard Rorty, 11 Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Cate-. 
gories," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 19 (1965), pp. 45-46. 
Although Mor1ck claims not to be a proponent of the EEG 
argument, he accepts the version of this argument sketched 
above~ 
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lead to a change in this position. So the proponents of the 
EEG argument who hold it to be merely tautological that a 
mistake about one's own current sensations made by one who 
knows the meaning of the words for these sensations is in-
conceivable seem to be caught in a dilemma. Either the EEG 
argument is intended to show how someone could be in a posi-
tion to override a person's honestly avowed reports about 
his own current sensations, in which case it is unnecessary. 
For as things are someone could be in such a position. Or 
it is intended to show how someone could be in a position 
to override a person's honestly avowed reports about his own 
current sensations even when that person is granted mastery 
of the words used to make these reports, in which case the 
argument is useless. For such a position is logically im-
possible in the sense that the statement describing it is 
self-contradictory. 
The argument against the second horn of the dilemma 
has evidently appeared so compelling as to outweigh the 
considerations against the first, for the philosophers in 
question are content to put forward the EEG argument as 
one intended to show how someone could be in a position to 
override a person's honestly avowed reports about his own 
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current sensations. Now it seems on the face of it not 
self-contradictory to assert that someone could be in a 
position to override a person's honest avowal of his own 
current sensations even when that person is granted mastery 
of the language. And, indeed, I think it is this view 
which must be rejected to preserve the significance of the 
EEG argument. This view, as we have seen, rests on the 
claim that it is merely tautological that a mistake about 
one's own current sensations made by one who knows the mean-
ing of the words for these sensations is inconceivable. 
What is the argument for this claim? It is that the distinc-
tion between verbal and factual error does not apply to a 
person's honest avowals of his own current sensations. 
• since the distinction between verbal and factual 
error, between misnaming and misjudging, doesn't apply 
to 'I am in pain,' it follows analytically that if a 
person knows what 'pain' means he cannot mistake}?ain 
for something else nor something else for pain.l 
Now this by itself does not establish the correctness of 
the claim. The argument would be valid only if it were 
also merely tautological that the distinction between 
verbal and factual error does not apply to a person's honest 
avowals of his own current sensations. But I do not see 
l,r • • ~oricK, ~· 
pp. 43-44. 
cit., p. 292. See also Rorty, !?.E.· cit. 
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that it is. The argument given for the lack of such a dis-
tinction is that there are no criteria whose satisfaction 
would establish that someone using a sensation-word correct-
ly on a certain occasion to make an honest report about his 
own current sensation is mistaken or, as it is sometimes 
put, that the criteria whose satisfaction would establish 
that someone who makes a report about his own current sensa-
tion on a certain occasion is mistaken are the same as the 
criteria whose satisfaction would establish that the rele-
vont sensation-word is being used incorrectly on that ceca-
sion • 
• • • where there are no criteria for misjudging (or 
to put it more accurately, where in the crucial cases 
the criteria for misjudging turn out to be the same 
as the criteria for misnaming), then to say that we 
are infallible is to pay ourselves an empty compli-
ment.! 
But clearly it is not merely tautological that there are 
no criteria for factual error in the case of honest reports 
of one's own current sensations or that the criteria for 
factual error turn out in this case to be the same as the 
criteria for verbal error. These are contingent facts. 
That the distinction between verbal and factual error does 
1 Rorty, ibid., p. 45. 
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not apply to a person's honest avowals of his own current 
sensations, therefore, is also a contingent fact and so can-
not legitimately be used to support the claim that it is 
merely tautological that a mistake about one's own current 
sensations made by one who knows the meaning of the words 
for these sensations is inconceivable. 
It may appear that the purpose of the foregoing argu-
ment is to show that it is conceivable that a mistake about 
one's own current sensations made by one who knows the mean-
ing of the words for these sensations is conceivable. In 
a way this is right. But it should be noticed that in this 
' 
reformulation of the intended conclusion, the word "conceiva-
ble" is being used to express different notions in its two 
occurrences. The intended conclusion could be restated 
in the following way so as to bring out the ambiguity: It 
is not self-contradictory for someone to be in a position 
to override a person's honestly avowed reports about his 
own current sensations even when that person is granted 
mastery of the words used to make these reports. That no 
one can be in such a position is based on the contingent 
fact that there are no criteria whose satisfaction would 
establish that someone using a sensation word correctly on a 
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certain occasion to make an honest report about his own 
current sensation is mistaken. 
With this shift from "merely tautological" to "merely 
based on a contingent fact," the EEG argument acquires not 
only significance but also force and persuasiveness. If it 
is a contingent fact that there are no criteria of the kind 
in question, then surely there could come to be such criteria. 
And it is the purpose of the EEG argument to describe cir-
cumstances in which it would be reasonable to introduce 
them. I do not think, however, that the circumstances de-
scribed by the EEG argument are ones in which it would be 
any more reasonable to introduce such criteria than the pres-
ent circumstances. That our epistemic position vis-a-vis 
our own current sensations is merely based on a contingent 
fact does not imply that this position is merely contingent 
on the present state of empirical inquiry. And there is 
a serious difficulty with the view that our epistemic posi-
tion vis-a-vis our own current sensations is merely contin-
. gent on the present state of empirical enquiry, which becomes 
apparent upon an examination of the EEG argument. The 
difficulty is this. According to the EEG argument, in cir-
cumstances in which there is a well-confirmed theory 
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correlating sensations with brain processes, it would be 
rational to override a person's honest avowal of sensation 
on the basis of a conflicting EEG report (provided there 
was not a sizeable accumulation of conflicts between similar 
avowals of other people and EEG reports). The question imme-
diately arises: Why should we not rather conclude that the 
theory is defective? Even a well-confirmed set of psycho-
physical correlation laws must be open to empirical disconfirma:-
tion. It is indeed the recognition of this point that lies 
behind the proviso that "there was not a sizeable accumula-
tion of conflicts between similar avowals of other people and 
EEG reports." The requirements that correlation laws be 
open to empirical disconfirmation seems also to underlie 
Morick's thesis that a person's honest avowal of his own cur-
rent psychological state cannot possibly be overridden by 
any evidence which is not supported by other such avowals 
from a sufficient number of overall competent speakers of 
th 1 . th . t 1 e anguage in e same circums ances. But I do not see 
why nothing can count as a disconf irmatory instance of a 
correlation law unless it is accompanied by other disconfirma-
tory instances. If a certain piece of metal were discovered 
1
see ~· cit., pp. 294-95. 
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to have all the known properties of copper except high elec-
trical conductivity, it would surely not be irrational to 
count it as a disconfirmatory instance of the law "Copper 
is a good electrical conductor." It would be possible, of 
course, to decide not to count the piece of metal as 
copper, but there seems to be no good reason for holding such 
a decision to be ~ rational than, say, the decision to 
count it as a new kind of copper. But, it may be objected, 
the psycho-physical correlations of the EEG argument are not 
mere empirical generalizations like, "Copper is a good elec-
trical conductor." They are part of a well-confirmed theory 
which explains and exhibits systematic connections between 
a wide variety of empirical generalizations about inner 
states and thus deals with a more extensive range of 
phenomena than does any given empirical generalization. 
The theory, moreover, is one from which more precise predic-
tions concerning inner states may be obtained and continual-
ly suggests new empirical laws which subsequently prove to 
be correct. Now there is good reason, the objection con-
cludes, to hold that a theory so central to current scien-
tific explanations cannot be broken down at one blow. But 
why should it be thought to follow from this that a corre-
lation which figures as part of the theory cannot be broken 
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down at one blow? That a theory is central to current scien-
tific explanations does not imply that every part of the 
theory is also central to current scientific explanations. 
And a theory of such great generality as is here envisaged 
has little to fear from the acknowledgement that it is defec-
tive in one of its parts. It would have something to fear, 
of course, from the acknowledgement of a defect which in-
volved the breakdown of a fundamental assumption of the theo-
ry. But clearly a law correlating, say, pain with a certain 
kind of brain process would not be a fundamental assumption 
of this theory. Nor need the falsification of such a law 
involve the breakdown of a fundamental assumption. A law 
correlating pain with a certain kind of brain process could 
be false if the set of initial or boundary conditions men-
tioned in its antecedent was not sufficient to exclude 
feelings closely resembling pain. And it might in fact be 
the case that the person whose honest avowal conflicts with 
an EEG report is the only person who ever had such feelings. 
The recognition of such a case need not lead to the break-
down of the theory or one of its fundamental assumptions, 
although it would prompt a search after the relevant differ-
ence or differences between the anomalous case and all 
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other cases so far observed. 
It may be objected that in any isolated case of con-
flict between a person's honest avowal and an EEG report 
in the circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument, we could 
conclude that the person is making a verbal mistake. Regard-
ing the expressions "pain" and "seems to me as if I were 
seeing something red," Rorty writes: 
• • • the device which we should use to justify our-
selves [in overriding sincere reports using these 
predicates in certain imaginable situations]--is one 
which can apply in all [Rorty's italics] proposed 
cases •••• this escape-hatch is always available, 
and • • • the question of whether the reporter does 
know how to use the word or does not is probably not 
itself a question which could ever be settled by re- 1 course to any absolute epistemological authority •••• 
This objection seems confused. In Rorty•s statement of the 
objection, I think it important to ask what he means by 
"this escape-hatch is always available." Does he mean sim-
ply that the device to which he alludes is one which can 
apply in all proposed cases of introspective reports? If 
so, then he is surely right. But this does not imply that 
it would be rational to apply the device in any proposed 
case of this kind. Does he mean then that it would be 
1 QE_. cit., p. 51. 
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rational to apply the device in any proposed case of this 
kind? If so, then he is wrong. For clearly there are some 
cases of introspective reports in which it would be not mere-
ly less rational to apply the device than not to apply it, 
but not rational to apply the device at all. Such cases 
are ones in which it has been established with certainty that 
the reporter doesknow how to use the relevant words. And 
surely there are such cases. I do not know what Rorty 
means by an "absolute epistemological authority" by recourse 
to which the question of whether the reporter does know how 
to use the relevant words or does not could be settled. 
But there are criteria whose satisfaction would establish 
with certainty that a person does understand the words.he 
is using to make an introspective report. The satisfaction 
of these criteria, of course, does not rule out the logical 
possibility that the reporter does not know how to use the 
relevant words, and it may even be established with cer-
tainty later that the reporter did not in fact know how to 
use the relevant words. If by "absolute epistemological 
authority" Rorty means an authority to which one could ap-
peal to rule out these possibilities, I agree that there is 
none.· But such possibilities provide no justification 
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whatever for the claim in any given case that someone mak-
ing an introspective report does not know how to use the 
relevant words. Even if we were to regard Rorty's statement 
"this escape-hatch is always available" as an ellipsis for 
"this escape-hatch is always available in any isolated case 
of conflict between an introspective report and an EEG 
report in the circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument," 
the above criticism would still apply. For there are some 
imaginable cases of this kind in which there would be no jus-
tification whatever for the claim that the reporter does not 
know how to use the relevant words. Such a case, for exam-
ple, would be one in which someone who does not exhibit pain-
behavior and has a long history of the correct use of the 
word "pain" reports that he has no pain, but an EEG report 
says that the brain process correlated with pain did occur. 
To reply that in any such case the "~ priori improbability" 
of "the body of current scientific theory foundering upon the 
rock of a single over-riding report" 1 gives some justifica-
tion to the claim that the reporter does not know how to 
use the relevant words would be, as I have argued, to appeal 
1Rorty, ibid., p. 51. 
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to a highly exaggerated picture of the situation. 
The circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument, accord-
ingly, do not preclude the occurrence of isolated cases of 
conflict between an honest first-person present-tense sensa-
tion-report and an EEG report in which it would be rational 
to conclude that the reporter does know how to use the rele-
vant words. This does not imply, however, that the existence 
of a well-confirmed theory correlating sensations with brain 
processes would provide any special reason for introducing 
criteria whose satisfaction would establish that someone 
using a sensation-word correctly on a certain occasion to 
make an honest report about his own current sensation is 
mistaken. And, if the foregoing argument is correct, such 
a theory would not provide any special reason for introduc-
ing these criteria. A given kind of sensation is correlated 
with a given kind of brain process only under certain condi-
tions. A conflict between an honest avowal of sensation 
by someone who is granted mastery of the language and an 
EEG report would prompt a search after the relevant differ-
ence or differences between the anomalous case and all other 
cases so far observed. And in fact no relevant difference 
may be found. But why should this be thought to show or 
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provide any reason for saying that the person whose avowal 
it is has made a mistake? As things are, our criteria for 
the existence and character of sensations consist in the 
occurrence of certain kinds of behavior. But the occurrence 
of a given kind of behavior is our criterion for the exis-
tence of a given kind of sensation only in certain circum-
stances. A conflict between an honest avowal of sensation 
by someone who is granted mastery of the language and his 
(non-verbal) behavior would prompt a search after something 
in the circumstances which made them abnormal. Has he 
been hypnotized, 1 drugged, electrified, etc.? Is his body 
subject periodically to unexpected and uncontrollable con-
vulsions, etc.? And in fact nothing unusual may be found. 
But, as things are, this would not show or provide any 
1Morick argues that if we judge that a hypnotized man 
who says, "I am in pain" is in fact not in pain, "then ipso 
facto we judge that his hypnotic 'I am in pain' fails to 
display knowledge of the correct use of this sentence for 
avowing pain" (.£E_. cit., p. 294). For reasons I shall not 
enter into here, I think his argument incorrect, but even if 
it were correct, it would not follow that if we judge that 
a hypnotized man who says, "I am in pain" is in fact not in 
pain, then ipso facto we judge that he does notklow how to 
use the word "pain." For the judgment that a man fails to 
display knowledge does not carry the implication that he 
lacks the knowledge he fails to display. And there are cri~ 
teria whose satisfaction would establish with certainty that 
a hypnotized man whom we judge not in fact.to be in pain 
when he says, "I am in pain" knows how to use the word 
"pain." 
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reason for saying that the person whose avowal it is has made 
a mistake. The failure to find something in the circumstances 
which made them abnormal would be a reason either for look-
ing further or for throwing up one's hands in despair of 
ever making sense of this piece of behavior. The analogy 
between the way things are and the way things would be given 
the existence of a well-confirmed theory correlating sensa-
tions with brain processes partially breaks down here. To 
throw up one's hands in despair when faced with an apparent 
disconfirmatory instance of a well-confirmed law does not 
manifest a scientific attitude. A scientifically respectable 
response, however, whose only purpose is to forestall an 
open declaration of despair is that of protecting the law 
with ad hoc assumptions. It is true that such "protection" 
very quickly approaches the limits of scientific respecta-
bility. 1 Even when these limits are reached, however, one 
need not abandon the law. One can simply cease to protect 
it. If the law is fundamental to current scientific explana-
tions, it would not be irrational to continue to employ it 
1cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind 
(London: Routledge & Kegan-Paul, 1968), p. 110. 
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for explanation and prediction while acknowledging the exis-
tence of evidence against it. Such an attitude toward the 
law would resemble the present attitude of a large part of 
the sciJ;:ntific community toward the wave and particle inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, if the 
law is not fundamental to current scientific explanations, 
these explanations would have little to fear from its aban-
donment. 
That the circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument 
are circumstances in which it would be reasonable to intro-
duce criteria whose satisfaction would establish that someone 
using a sensation-word correctly on a certain occasion to 
make an honest report about his own current sensation is 
mistaken, accordingly, cannot be shown by the EEG argument. 
If this cannot be shown by the EEG argument, however, there 
is good reason to think that this cannot be shown at all. 
For it would be reasonable to introduce such criteria only 
if it already made sense for a person to be mistaken, say, 
as to whether he is in pain. But this makes sense only if 
it also makes sense for a person to be in doubt as to wheth-
er he is in pain. And it is senseless for a person to be 
in doubt as to whether he is in pain where it is senseless 
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for a person to find out whether i1e is in pain. But ft is 
senseless for a person to find out whether he is in pain. 
For consider the possible ways in which, it might be said, 
a person could find out whether he is in pain. It might be 
said that a person could find out whether he is in pain by 
applying to himself a physiological criterion of pain. But 
it would make sense for a person to apply to himself a physic-
logical criterion of pain only if such a criterion had been 
introduced. Since ~ hypothesi it would not be reasonable 
to introduce such a criterion unless it already made sense 
for a person to be mistaken as to whether he is in pain, 
however, it would not be reasonable to introduce one unless 
it already made sense for a person to find out whether he is 
in pain. Or it might be said that a person could find out 
whether he is in pain by observing his pain. But there is 
no difference between observing one's own pain and having it. 
What this proposal comes to then is that a person could find 
out whether he is in pain from his pain, that is, simply 
b h . h . 't 1 y aving or not aving i • Now there is a (possible) 
:tnus proposal is defended by Gregory Sheridan. See 
his article, "The Electroencephalogram Argument against 
Incorrigibility," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6 
(1969), p. 69. 
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sense of "find out" in which it is true that a person does 
find out whether he is in pain by having or not having a 
pain, but this is not the sense of "find out" in which it 
must make sense for a person to find out whether he is in 
pain if it is to make sense for a person to be in doubt as to 
whether he is in pain. A person finds out whether he is in 
pain by having or not having a pain in the sense that having 
or not having a pain puts him in a position and gives him the 
right to say that he is in pain or that he is not in pain. 1 
It is senseless, however, for a person to be in doubt about 
what he can find out in this sense. If it is to make sense 
for a person to be in doubt as to whether he is in pain, it 
must make sense for him to find out whether he is in pain 
in the sense in which he can find out, say, the position of 
his limbs, that is, by a kind of observing which goes beyond 
the mere having of what is being observed. A person does 
not find out that his arm is straight in the sense that his 
arm's being straight puts him in a position and gives him 
1
cf. A. J. Ayer, "Privacy," in his The Concept of~ Per-
son (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963),p. 64; Sydney 
Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge~ Self-Identity (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 216; William Alston, 
"Varieties of Privileged Access," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), p. 234. 
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the right to say that his arm is straight. For it is not 
senseless for someone honestly to say that his arm is bent 
when it is straight. Normally, a person knows whether his 
arm is straight without finding out whether his arm is 
straight. But it does make sense for a person to find out 
whether his arm is straight (and indeed it must make sense, 
since a person can be mistaken as to whether his arm is 
straight)--not by observing his kinesthetic sensations, 
which is a kind of observing, if it may be called an "observ-
ing" at all, that does not go beyond the mere having of 
what is being observed, but by looking. 1 
Consider, then, whether it does make sense for a person 
to find out whether he is in pain by observing whether he 
is in pain in the sense of "observing" which goes beyond the 
mere having of what is being observed. The only plausible 
1This seems to be Malcolm's point in the passage from 
"The Privacy of Experience" (in Avrum Stroll (ed.), Epis-
temology (New York, Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 147-151) 
wfiich Sheridan is criticizing when he claims that a person 
finds out whether he is in pain by having or not having a 
pain. Sheridan asks: "Why would I have to observe my own 
behavior and listen to my words in order not to be in doubt 
about my sensations? Would I not still know my sensations 
as a result of directly experiencing them?," (~. cit., p. 
69). The point, however, is not that the introduction of 
first-person doubts into the language of sensations com-
mits us to the view that a person would have to observe 
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object of observation in this sense, I believe, is a per-
son's pain-behavior. The proposal then is that a person 
finds out whether he is in pain by observing his own pain-
behavior. 1 Now how could a person find out whether he is in 
pain in this sense of "find out?" As Wittgenstein remarks 
it would be necessary for him to take notion of himself as 
others do, to listen to himself talking, to be able to 
I 2 
draw conclusions from what he says. But if this were possible 
his own behavior and listen to his own words in order not 
to be in doubt about his sensations, but rather that it would 
have to make sense for a person to observe his own behavior 
and listen to his own words in order to find out what his 
sensations are. 
1Although it is not really clear, this proposal seems 
to be defended by Rorty in "Wittgenstein, Privileged Ac-
cess, and Inconununicability, 11 American Philosophical Quar-
terly, vol. 7 (1970), p. 202. Rorty speaks of a person's 
utterances and inclinations or dispositions to utter cer-
tain first-person reports such as, "I am in pain" as his 
evidence for the truth of the proposition that he is in 
pain. He also speaks, however, of a person's belief that 
he is in pain as his evidence for the truth of the proposi-
tion that he is in pain. This suggests that it is not by 
observing one's own pain-behavior that one finds out wheth-
er one is in pain. Yet, by "belief" he seems to mean "the 
expression of belief." This is suggested by his remark 
" • • • other people certainly take my beliefs about my 
mental states as evidence for their own beliefs about my 
mental states. So why shouldn't I?" In any case, his 
defense of the view set forth in this passage is simply 
that its denial carries the "paradoxical" implication that 
there is no genuine use of the verb "to know" as an expres-
sion of certainty with first-person present-tense sensation 
statements. · 
2
see Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 192. 
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it would make sense to say such things as "Judging from 
what I say, I must be in pain" and "It seems to me that 
I am not in pain, but, judging from what I say, this 
isn't true. " "Monologues 11 c£. the sort imagined by Malcolm 
would also make sense: "I shall sometimes ask myself, 'Does 
it hurt?' If I reply, "Yes, it does,' then I shall know 
that I have pain, my evidence being that I myself said ~1 111 
But, further, others notice and draw conclusions from not only 
what a person says but also what a person does. Pain-behavior 
is what pain-explanations explain. Declining an invitation, 
making an appointment to see the dentist, hiring someone to 
do the heavy work involved in running one's business, even a 
person's selling his business and marrying someone who he 
knows can be depended on to take care of him are sometimes 
. f . b h . 2 instances o pain- e avior. If, then, a person could take 
notice of himself and draw conclusions from his own behavior 
as others do, it would make sense to say such things as 
"Judging from the fact that I am trying to sell my business 
and have proposed to Mary, I must be in pain" and "It seems 
to me that I am not in pain, but, judging from the fact that I 
2cf. supra, chap. II, pp. 37-41. 
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am trying to sell my business and have proposed to Mary, 
this isn't true." But to say such things does not make 
sense. They are senseless in the sense that we would not 
understand the Eerson who said them. Wittgenstein remarks: 
"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. 111 
The reason why we could not understand him is not that we 
could not understand what he said. We could not understand 
him, because his verbal behavior would diverge too far from 
the normal behavior of beings to whom we ordinarily apply 
the concept of a person. Whatever the lion said would be 
senseless in the sense that we would never understand him. 
It is of course false that we would never be able to under-
stand a person who exhibited the sort of verbal behavior 
we have been imagining. But this behavior would have the 
same sort of unintelligibility that would for us be a fea-
ture of the verbal behavior of any being not falling under 
the concept of a person. 
l . Op. cit., p. 223. Cf. supra, chap. II, Pp. 54-55. 
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